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FOREWORD

O NE OF

THE conspicuous results of the ordeal through

which our world has been passing is a widespread disposition
to re-examine the concepts of racial superiority which have been
the source of so much human misery. Historical causes reaching
far back into North American origins have made the Negro race
the chief victims here. Since emancipation and the War Amendments to the Constitution many questions of law growing out of
the plight of this handicapped minority have found their way into
the Supreme Court. So far as the writer knows no attempt has
been made hitherto to assemble all such cases in the order of their
hearing and decision, and with sufficient detail to give to each case
its proper place as a link in the chain of adaptation of Federal law
to changing economic and social conditions, and the growth of public intelligence and conscience. This is such an attempt.'
At the outset the writer disclaims approach to his task from the
standpoint of an expert in constitutional law or legal history. Indeed, for his purpose little professional qualification has been
found necessary beyond familiarity with the terminology of the
courts. His aim has been to present a record of facts,-facts from
*Judge of the District Court for the Fourth District, Minnesota, 19111941 (retired).
M'The writer is indebted to the well-known books of Carson, Warren,
Mangum and Stephenson; but these serve only partially the purpose which
he has set before himself in this study. Valuable also is Osmond K. Fraenkel's
article. One Hundred and Fifty Years of the Bill of Rights, 23 MINNESOTA
L xw REVIEW 719 (1939), with the three supplements issued by the American
Civil Liberties Union in 1941, 1944, and 1945.
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that most authoritative source, the official reports of the United
States Supreme Court. The issues, the events out of which they
have arisen, the decisions, are facts. The quotations from decisions
and dissents are facts. The chronological sequence of cases is an
important fact. Except for indulgence in occasional comment, the
only risk of being hampered by his own limitations which he has
incurred is in his effort to present in each case the important point
decided and in many instances summarize the reasons stated for
the decision, and in the selection of quotations designed to give the
essence of majority and minority views. To do this has called for
study, discrimination and a degree of objectivity, and if he has
failed in these respects his work is of little value. If, however, he
has succeeded in his attempt to be accurate and fair, the result may
prove to be worth while.
The record of the Supreme Court for ability, integrity and freedom from political bias and social prejudice is one of which our
people may well be very proud. But even in the pure atmosphere
of the Washington court-room and consultation chamber members
of the Court do not cease to be human beings. Instances have
been frequent in which as members of the Court men who have been
active in political life, and professionally associated with special
business interests, have been able to break away completely from
the prejudices and preconceptions of their former environment;
but it is nevertheless true that in the history of the Court there
can be traced the influence of current public sentiment. "The
Supreme Court feels the touch of public opinion. Opinion is
stronger in America than anywhere else in the world, and judges
are only men . . . Of course whenever the law is clear, because
the words of the Constitution are plain or the cases interpreting
them decisive on the point raised, the Court must look solely to
those words and cases, and cannot permit any other consideration
to affect its mind. But when the terms of the Constitution admit
of more than one construction, and when previous decisions have
left the true construction so far open that the point in question
may be deemed new, is a court to be blamed if it prefers the construction which the bulk of the people deem suited to the needs
of the time ?" These words of Sir James Bryce2 will hardly be resented by the staunchest admirers of the Court, and there have not
been wanting critics who have put the point in harsher terms.
To thus evaluate the decisions is no part of the writer's purpose. The material is here and readers may interpret it as they see
2

The American Commonwealth, p. 273.
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fit. Neither has he sought to trace the decisions in the narrow field
here studied to the legal concepts developed by the Court in other
fields. He presents the judicial facts encountered in his study; the
political, economic, social-and sometimes, perhaps, personalcauses of those facts are left for the consideration of others.
When the lawyer is seeking for a precedent the point decided
and the argument by which the decision is reached are the matters
of importance. When the student of law, government or social welfare is seeking for truth dissenting opinions in the law reports
which are not precedents may have great value. Therefore a generous amount of space has been given to quotations from dissents.
Chief Justice Hughes has said: "Unanimity which is merely
formal, which is recorded at the expense of strong, conflicting
views, is not desirable in a court of last resort .... This is so because what must ultimately sustain the court in public confidence
is the character and independence of the judges. They are not there
simply to decide cases, but to decide them as they think they should
be decided, and while it may be regrettable that they cannot always
agree, it is better that their independence should be maintained
and recognized than that unanimity should be secured through its
sacrifice.... Dissenting opinions enable a judge to express his individuality .... He is not under the compulsion of speaking for the
court and thus of securing the concurrence of a majority. In dissenting he is a free lance. A dissent in a court of last resort is an
appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a
future day."3
May the writer add a personal word? He believes this review
gives a fair and reasonably accurate picture of almost ninety years'
progress toward justice for the Negro race in the nation's highest
court. It has been slow and halting progress, but where it can be
found he has made no attempt to conceal his satisfaction. Slow as
the advance has been, from the Dred Scott Case to that of Morgan
vs. Virginia is a long way. He opened his eyes upon a torn and distracted country when the fires from the Dred Scott eruption were
kindling civil war. In his early years he was impressed with the
enormity of our national crime. Perhaps he has been moved, in
part, to undertake this study because there echoes in his memory
the refrain of a song familiar in his childhood"John Brown's body lies a-mouldering in the grave,
But his soul goes marching on!"
"The Supreme Court of the United States (1928), pp. 67, 68.
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I.
CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY

Among notable decisions of the United States Supreme Court
the Dred Scott Case4 stands out like a mountain shrouded in
thunder-clouds. It held in substance (two Justices, McLean and
Curtis, dissenting) that none of the provisions of the United
States Constitution establishing or protecting rights of citizens
applied to a member of "the Negro African race," even though free
in the state of his residence. In building up the historical argument
in support of this conclusion Chief Justice Taney said, in reference
to conditions in the Thirteen Colonies at and prior to the framing
of the Constitution: "In the opinion of the Court, the legislation
and history of the times, and the language used in the Declaration
of Independence, show that neither the class of persons who had
been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had
become free or not, were then acknowledged as part of the people,
nor intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable instrument. .

.

. They had for more than a century before

been regarded as beings of an inferior order; and altogether unfit
to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations;' and so far inferior that they had no rights which the white
man was bound to respect." 5 In fairness to the majority, as represented by the Chief Justice, it should be said that they seem to have
mildly deprecated this state of public opinion, which they declare
to have "prevailed in the civilized and enlightened portions of the
world." The Court further, for the second time in its history, declared an Act of Congress to be unconstitutional and void,-the
so-called "Missouri Compromise" of 1820; thereby denying the
power of Congress to prohibit slavery in any of the states or territories of the Union.
The decision was never formally over-ruled, and yet it has never
been cited by the Court as an authoritative precedent, except on
certain procedural points, and in a few instances by quotations of
language of the Chief Justice on uncontroverted matters. Concerning it an editorial writer in the American Law Review said while
the country was in the throes of Reconstruction: "The calmer
judgment of posterity may, perchance, say that as an abstract
question of constitutional law the Chief Justice rightly interpreted
the law as it was, and that the dissenting voices only proclaimed
4

Dred Scott v. Sandford, (1857) 19 How. 393, 15 L. Ed. 691.
5At p. 407 of 19 How.
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what it should have been. Revolution has confirmed their dissent,
and if amendment were needed, the sword has amended the construction now."
Twice afterward before its earlier phases were submitted to
the arbitrament of war "the Negro question" came before the
Supreme Court. In Ablentan vs. Booth,7 a controversy between
the State of Wisconsin and the Federal Government, arising under
the Fugitive Slave Law, Chief Justice Taney, without dissent, sustained the constitutionality of that statute "in all its provisions,"
and declared the supremacy of the Court in all matters of interpretation and execution of powers claimed under the Constitution and
Acts of Congress. Ex parte Kentucky vs. Dennisons came up in
March, 1861. A Kentucky statute made it a crime to assist a slave
to escape. One Lago was indicted under this statute and took
refuge in Ohio. On demand of the State of Kentucky that he be
surrendered for trial the Governor of Ohio refused. Thereupon an
application was made to the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, on the ground that the Constitution made it the duty of
the Governor of Ohio to comply. The Court, by Taney, C. J.,
recognized the obligation but held that it was only a moral one
which could not be enforced by mandamus.
Before the Negro was again in the Supreme Court came the
Civil War, the Freedmen's Bureau, the Reconstruction Act, and
the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments' The administration of the
Freedmen's Bureau practically superseded state legislation affecting Negroes and this policy was continued with varying success
during Reconstruction. In 1872 the General Amnesty Act was
67 Am. Law Rev. 327 (1872), quoted with approval by Warren, The
Supreme Court in United States History, Vol. 3, p. 120.
7(1859) 21 How. 506, 16 L. Ed. 169.
8(1861) 24 How. 66, 16 L. Ed. 717.
O'For the convenience of the reader the immediately relevant portions of
these Amendments are here reproduced: Art. XIII, Sec. 1, ratified in 1865:
"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punisnment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction... ." Art. XIV,
Sec. 1, ratified in 1868: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws .. " Art. XV, Sec. 1, ratified in 1870: "The
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any state on account of race, color or previous
condition of servitude. . . ." Each Amendment contains a section providing
that Congress shall have power to enforce it by appropriate legislation.
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passed, by 1877 "carpet-bag" government had come to an end, and
by 1879 the whites-had regained virtual control throughout the
South.
II
CHIEF JUSTICE CHASE

The first case in which the Court was called upon to interpret
any of the Acts of Congress passed for the purpose of giving effect
to the new Amendments was Blyew vs. U. S.,10 a criminal case
which came up from the U. S. Circuit Court, District of Kentucky. The indictment was drawn under the original Civil Rights
Act of April 9, 1866, which had been passed in order to implement the 13th Amendment, and charged Blyew and another,
who were whites, with the murder of a Negro woman who was a
citizen of the United States. It was averred that the crime was
witnessed by certain colored persons, also citizens of the United
States, who were denied the right to testify against the defendants in the courts of Kentucky solely because of their race
and color. There was a verdict of guilty and an appeal from the
denial of a motion in arrest of judgment. The point presented for
decision was whether the Circuit Court had jurisdiction of the
offense. The constitutionality of the Act was attacked in the briefs
of counsel for the plaintiffs in error, but was not considered by the
Court.
The first section of the Act declared that all persons born in
the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, exclusive
of Indians not taxed, were citizens of the United States; and also
provided that "Such citizens, of every race and color, shall have
the same rights in every State and Territory of the United States,
to make and enforce contracts; to sue, to be parties and give evidence; to inherit, to purchase, lease, hold and convey real and personal property, and to have full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed
by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains
and penalties and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to the contrary notwithstanding." The second
section provided penalties for violation of the Act: "That any
person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, tegulation
or custom" shall deprive "any inhabitant of any State or Territory"
10(1872) 13 Wall. 581, 20 L. Ed. 638.
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of rights secured by the first section "on account of such persons
having at any time been held in a condition of involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall'
have been duly convicted, or by reason of his color or race, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor," etc. The third section gave the District Courts of the United States, concurrently with the Circuit
Courts, exclusive jurisdiction "of all causes, civil and criminal,
affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts
or judicial tribunals of the state or the locality where they may be,
any of the rights secured to thenby the first section of this Act."
A Kentucky statute in effect when the indictment was found provided "that a slave, Negro or Indian, shall be a competent witness
in the case of the Commonwealth for or against a slave, Negro or
Indian, and in a civil case to which Negroes or Indians are parties,
but in no other case." The claim that the cause was one "affecting"
the murdered woman, within the meaning of the third section of
the Act, was thus summarily disposed of: "We need hardly add
that the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is not sustained by the
fact averred in the indictment that Lucy Armstrong, the person
murdered, was a citizen of the African race, and for that reason
denied the right to testify in the Kentucky courts. In no sense
can she be said to be affected by the cause. Manifestly the Act
refers to persons in existence."" Justice Strong, who wrote the
Court's opinion, posed the essential question to be decided as
follows: "Was, then, the prosecution or indictment against these
defendants a cause affecting any such person or persons?" (i.e.,
"persons who are denied and cannot enforce in the courts . . . of
any rights secured to them by the first section of the

the state ...

Act.") This question was answered in the negative and jurisdiction
denied. Neither the Chief Justice nor Justice Nelson took part.
The case is noteworthy because of the broad language used
by Justice Bradley (Swayne, J., concurring)-in his dissenting
opinion, which seems to contrast strongly with the position which
he took eleven years later when he spoke for the Court in the very
important Civil Rights Cases.-2 Commenting on Sec. 1 he said:
"This is the fundamental section of the Act. All that follows is
intended to secure or vindicate, to the objects of it, the rights
herein declared, and to establish the requisite machinery to that
end. This section is in direct conflict with those state laws which
forbade a free colored person to remove to or to pass through the
"At p. 593 of 13 Wall.
12(1883) 109 U. S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835. See p. 241 in4ra.
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state, from having firearms, from exercising the functions of a
minister of the gospel, or from keeping a house of entertainment;
laws which prohibited all colored persons from being taught to read
and write, from holding or conveying property, and from being
witnesses in any case where a white person was concerned; and
laws which subjected them to cruel and ignominious punishments
not imposed upon white persons, such as to be sold as vagrants, to
be tied to the whipping post, etc., etc. All these, and all other discriminations, were intended to be abolished and done away with...
It is evident that the provisions of the second section, making it a
criminal offense to deprive a person of his rights or to subject him
to a discriminating punishment, would fail to reach a great number
of cases which the broad and liberal provisions of the first section
were intended to cover and protect. The clause in question is intended
to reach these cases, or at least-a large class of them. It provides a remedy where the state refuses to give ofie; ivhere the mischief consists in
inaction.,or) refusal'to' act, or refusal to give requisite relief ; whereas
the second section provides for actual positive invasion of rights....
Suppose that in any state assault and battery, mayhem-nay,
murder itself, could be perpetrated upon a colored man with impunity; no law being provided for punishini the offender, would
not that be a' case of denial of rights to the colored population of
that. state ? ... Would not the clause of the Civil Rights Bill now
under consideration give jurisdiction to the United States Courts in
such a case? .

.

. The case before us is just as clearly within the

scope of the--law as such a case would be. I do not put it upon the
ground that the witnesses of the murder, or some of them, are
colored persons;, disqualified by the laws of Kentucky to testify,
but on the ground that the cause is one affecting the rights of the
person murdered; as well as the whole class of persons to -which
she belonged. Had the case been simple assault and battery, the
injured party would have been deprived of a right, enjoyed by
,every white citizen, of entering a complaint before a magistrate, or
the grand jury, and of appearing as a witness in the trial of the
offender. .

.

. To deprive a whole class of the community of this

*right,to refuse their evidence and their sworn complaints, is to brand
them with a badge of. slavery; is to expose them to wanton insults
and fiendish assaults ; is to leave their lives, their families and their
,property unprotected by law. It gives unrestricted license to vindictive-outlaws and felons to'rush-upon these helpless people and kill
and slay them at will, as was done in this case. To say thai actions
or prosecutions intended for the redress of such outrages are not
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'causes affecting the persons' who are the victims of them, is to
take, it seems to me, a view of the law too narrow, too technical
and too forgetful of the liberal objects it had in view .... If the
case above supposed is within the Act (as it assuredly must be)
does it cease to be so when the violence offered is so great as to
deprive the victim of life? . . . The reason for its existence is

stronger than before. If it would have been a cause affecting him
when living, it will be a cause affecting him though dead. The
object of prosecution and punishment is to prevent crime as well
as to vindicate public justice .... Should not the colored man have
the aegis of this protection to guard his life, as well as to guard
his limbs or property? . . . At all events it cannot be denied that

the entire class of persons under disability is affected by prosecutions for wrongs- done to one of their number; in 'which they are
not permitted to testify in the State Courts."" Though the majority
opinion did not discuss the constitutionality of the statute, Justice
Bradley declared himself on this point: "I have no doubt of the
power of Congress to pass the laws now under consideration.
Slavery, when it existed, extended its influence in every direction,
depressing, disfranchising the slave in every possible way .... The

power to enforce the Amendment (13th) by appropriate legislation
must be a power to do away with the incidents and consequences
of slavery, and to instate the freedmen in full enjoyment of that
'14
civil liberty and equality which the abolition of slavery meant."
Although the crime considered in this case was committed after
the ratification of the 14th Amendment, no reference to "that
Amendment was made either in the briefs of counsel or the opinions. The case has never been cited as an authority in any Supreme
Court opinion,-perhaps on account of the early repeal of the
Kentucky statute and modification of the original Civil Rights Act;
but comparison with one of the later cases mentioned in this review,
Screws v. U. S.,11 will suggest the great advance made since 1872
in the protection of the civil rights of Negroes under the Constitution.
Later in 1872 U. S. vs. Avery,'16 came before the Court on a
certificate of division of opinion 'from South Carolina. The de13At
pp. 595-601 of 109 U. S.
14 Justice Swayne, sitting in the United States Circuit Court, District of
Kentucky, had already held the Act of April 6, 1866, to be constitutional in
all respects, and had construed it in line with the dissenting opinion; U. S. v.
Rhodes. (1866)

97 F.YI. Cp.

NTO

16151.

1"(1945) 325 U. S. 91, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 89 L. Ed. 1495.
10(1872) 13 Wall. 251, 20 L. Ed. 610.
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fendants were indicted under Section 6 of the Enforcement Act
of May 31, 1870, for conspiring to prevent a Negro from voting
and from exercising his constitutional right to carry arms, and for
hanging him in pursuance of the conspiracy. The Circuit Court
Judges presented two important questions, one of them constitutional, which were disposed of as follows by Chief Justice Chase:
"A majority of the Court are of the opinion that this case is controlled by the decision in the case of The U. S. vs. Rosenberg.
I am unable to concur in that opinion, but the case must be dismissed." U. S. vs. Rosenbergl"a had held merely that the Court
could ,not acquire jurisdiction upon a certificate of division of
opinion on the question as to whether a motion to quash an indictment ought to be granted. Surely -it is not without significance
that in 1872 a Supreme Court consisting wholly of men appointed
,from the loyal states dismissed, on a point of procedure, a case
involving the lynching of a Negro, without a word of comment,
ignoring the constitutional question which was involved.
The 14th Amendment came first before the Court for interpretation in the much-discussed Slaughter-Hou.ise Cases,'7 a fiveto-four decision handed down in April, 1873. The majority opinion
establishes certain important principles which have been consistently
adhered to,--that the Constitution provides for a citizenship of the
United States as distinct from state citizenship; that privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States which are placed under
the protection of Congress by the 14th Amendment "are those
which arise out of the nature and essential character of the national
government, the provisions of its Constitution or its laws and
treaties made in pursuance thereof." It was further held that the
second clause of Sec. 1 of the 14th Amendment "protects from the
hostile legislation of the state the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States as distinguished from the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the states. These latter .

.

. embrace

generally those fundamental civil rights for the security and
establishment of which organized society is instituted, and they
remain, with certain exceptions mentioned in 'the Federal Constitution, under the care of the state governments."
The case before the Court involved the constitutionality of
legislation in Louisiana, which, it was claimed, established a business monopoly; and the attack was made under various provisions
of the Constitution,-chiefly those of the 14th Amendment. The
16a(1869) 7 Wall. 580, 19 L. Ed. 263.
'7(1873) 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 395.
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majority sustained the statute as a proper exercise of the police
power of the state, but declined to go further in defining "the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States which
no state can abridge, until some case involving those privileges
may make it necessary to do so."'"1

In reaching a restrictive interpretation of the 14th Amendment
the Court declared that its primary purpose, as shown both by its
history and its terms, was to confer rights of citizenship on members of the Negro race, and protect them from injustices to which
they were being subjected, notwithstanding their release from
slavery. On this point there was no disagreement in the Court; but
the minority (Chase, C. J., Field, Bradley and Swayne, JJ.,Justice Bradley writing the main dissenting opinion, and Justice
Swayne supplementing it) argued vigorously for a more liberal
view of the protection actually given by the Amendment, claiming that in spite of the possibility of undue interference with state
legislation it should be construed as covering "the natural and
inalienable rights which belong to all citizens,"'19 which they considered to be invaded by the Louisiana statute.
Few cases more pregnant with vast results have ever been in
any court. In the prevailing opinion Justice Miller says: "No
questions so far-reaching and pervading in their consequences, so
profoundly interesting to the people of this country, and so important in their bearing upon the relations of the United States
and of the several states to each other, and to the citizens of the
states and of the United States, have been before this Court during,
the official life of any of its members"; and justice Swayne concludes his dissenting opinion with the solemn words--"I personally
hope that the consequences to follow may prove less serious and
far-reaching than the minority fear they will be." In Twining vs.
New Jersey,2 0 the unanimous Court speaking by Moody, J., said:
"There can be no doubt, so far as the decision in the SlaughterHouse Cases has determined the question, that the civil rights sometimes described as fundamental and inalienable, which, before the
War Amendments, were enjoyed by state citizenship and protected
by state government, were left untouched by this clause (i. e., the
privileges and immunities) of the 14th Amendment. Criticism of this
case has never entirely ceased, nor has it ever received universal as18At p. 79 of 16 Wall.
19For a demonstration that this was the view of those who framed the
Amendment and supported it in Congress, see Horace E. Flack, The Adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, (1908).
20(1908) 211 U. S. 78,29 S. Ct. 14,53 L. Ed. 97.
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sent by members of this Court. Undoubtedly it gave much less effect
to the Fourteenth Amendment than some of the public men active in
framing it intended, and disappointed many others. On the other
hand, if the views of the minority had prevailed it is easy to see
how far the authority and independence of the states would have
been diminished, by subjecting all their legislative and judicial acts
to correction by the legislative and review by the judicial branch
of the national government. But we need not now inquire into
the merits of the original dispute. This part, at least, of the
Slaughter-House Cases has been steadily adhered to by the Court."
It would require a bold and active imagination to conjecture what
the judicial history of the United States during the last seventy
years would have been, had one other Justice joined the dissenting group.
Later in 187321 the Negro came into the Court again, in Wash-,
ington, A. & G. R. R. Co. vs. Brown.2 2 The plaintiff in error operated a railroad under an incorporating Act of Congress, passed in
1863, which provided that no one should be excluded from its cars
on the ground of color. A Negro woman who, solely by reason of
her color, was ejected from a car reserved for white women, sued
for damages, and her right to do so was sustained. No constitutional question was involved.
III.
CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE
2

U. S. vs. Reese was the first case involving the 15th Amendment to reach the Court. It was a criminal case from Kentucky, a
prosecution under Sections 3 and 4 of the Enforcement Act of
May' 31, 1870, for refusing to receive the vote of a Negro at a
municipal election. It was held that the Amendment did not confer
a right of franchise, but merely a right not to be discriminated
against with respect thereto by any state because of color. Said
Chief Justice Waite in the prevailing opinion (Clifford, J., concurred on different grounds, and Hunt, J., dissented, taking a
very broad view of the scope of the Amendment and the interpretation of the statute) : "The Amendment has invested the citizens
of the United States with a new constitutional right which is
21

Chief Justice Chase had died and his successor had not yet been commissioned.
22(1873) 17 Wall. 445, 21 L. Ed. 675.
23(1876) 92 U. S. 214, 23 L. Ed. 563.
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231

within the protecting care of Congress. That right is exemption
from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on
account of race, color or previous condition of servitude. This,
under the express provisions of the 2nd section of the Amendment,
Congress may enforce by 'appropriate legislation.' "24 It was held,
however, that Sections 3 and 4, by reason of being too general in
their terms, were not "appropriate legislation" and were unconstitutional.
The Act in question was a substantial reenactment of the original Enforcement Act of 1866, with some changes and additions
designed especially to implement the 15th Amendment. Section 1
provided that all citizens of the United States, otherwise qualified
to vote, should be "entitled and allowed" to vote at any election
"without distinction of race, color or previous condition of servitude." Section 2 provided in general terms for penalties for the
violation of Section 1. Sections 3 and 4 related specifically to acts
done by officials to obstruct the performance by a citizen of a legal
requirement for voting, and as construed by the majority did not
in express terms provide that the wrongful act should be one of
race discrimination. The view of the majority was that since Sections 3 and 4 were not limited to race discrimination an indictment including this as an element of the offense charged was invalid, since, the statute being a criminal one, such limitation must
clearly appear; and that in their general terms the sections were
not warranted by the 15th Amendment. The Court said: "We are
therefore directly called upon to decide whether a penal statute
enacted by Congress, with its limited powers, which is in general
language broad enough to cover wrongful acts without as well as
within the constitutional jurisdiction, can be limited by judicial
construction so as to make it operate only on that which Congress
may rightfully prohibit and punish .... The proposed effect is not
to be attained by striking out or disregarding words that are in
the section, but by inserting those that are not now there .... To
limit this statute in the manner now asked for would be to make
a new law, not to enforce an old one. This is no part of our duty.' 25
At the same term with the Reese Case, there was decided a
case under Section 6 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, U. S. vs.
Cruikshank3 The doctrine of The Slaughter-House Cases was
strictly applied, and each of the counts of the indictment found not
24At p. 218 of 92 U. S.
2
5At p. 221 of 92 U. S.
26(1876) 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588.
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to state a criminal offense against the United States, sometimes
because the pleading was insufficient, sometimes because the right
alleged to have been denied or invaded was not incident to United
States citizenship. The case has been so frequently cited that it
seems proper to consider it in this inquiry with a degree of detail
which is hardly warranted by its value as a precedent. Section 6
of the Act in question provided: "That if two or more persons shall
band or conspire together, or go in disguise upon the public highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to violate any provision of this Act, or to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate any
citizen, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having exercised the same, such persons shall be guilty of a felony" and shall be
punished in the manner thereinafter prescribed. Cruikshank and
certain co-defendants were tried on an indictment of sixteen counts
and were found guilty generally upon all of them. The case came
to the Supreme Court on a certificate of division of opinion from
the United States Circuit Court for the District of Louisiana,
which considered a motion in arrest of judgment. It involved an
instance of fraud and violence to prevent Negroes from voting, and
is thus summarized by the Court: "The general charge in the first
eight counts is that of 'banding' and in the second eight that of
'conspiring' together to injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate
Levi Nelson and Alexander Tillman, citiiens of the United States
of African descent and persons of color, with the intent thereby to
hinder and prevent them in the free exercise and enjoyment of the
rights and privileges 'granted and secured' to them 'in common with
all other good citizens of the United States by the Constitution and
laws of the United States.' ",
The opinion, presented by Chief Justice Waite, began by recognizing the duality of citizenship, and the differentiation between
rights arising from citizenship of the United States and state
citizenship, established by The Slaughter-House Cases. The relation between the national government and that of the states was
discussed and it was again declared that the former "can neither
grant nor secure to its citizens any right or privilege not expressly
28
or by implication placed under its jurisdiction.
The specific rights charged in the indictment to have been
violated were (1) "to peaceably assemble together with each other
27At p.
2"At p.

548 of 92 U. S.
550 of 92 U. S.
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and with other citizens of the United States for a peaceful and
lawful purpose;" (2) "to bear arms for a lawful purpose ;" (3)
"to be secure against deprivation of life and liberty of person
'without due process of law;'" (4) "to vote at any election thereafter to be held by the people in and of the said State of Louisiana."
The first was declared to be a right not created by the Constitution,
but one antedating the Constitution and "found wherever civilization exists." The indictment did not fall within the First Amendment because it did not allege that the assembly alleged to have
been interfered with was for the purpose of petitioning the Government for the redress of grievances. "If it had been alleged in
these counts that the object of the defendants was to prevent a
meeting for such a purpose, the case would have been within the
statute and within the scope of the sovereignity of the United
States.'2 Concerning the second right the Court said: "This is

not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner
dependent on that instrument for its existence. The Second Amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but this ...

means no

more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress." 30 As to the
third right: "The rights of life and personal liberty are natural
rights of man .... It is no more the duty nor within the power of
the United States to punish for conspiracy to falsely imprison or
murder within a state than it would be to punish for false imprisonment or murder itself. The 14th Amendment prohibits any
state from depriving any person of life or property without due
process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen
against another. It simply furnishes an additional guaranty against
any encroachment by the states upon the fundamental rights which
belong to every citizen as a member of society." 31 As to the right
to vote the Court said, citing U. S. vs. Reese, just decided: "The
right of suffrage is not a necessary attribute of national citizenship;
but exemption from discrimination in the exercise of that right
on account of race, etc., is. The right to vote in the states comes
from the states; but the right of exemption from the prohibited
discrimination comes from the United States .... Inasmuch, there-

fore, as it does not appear in these counts that the intent of the
defendants was to prevent these parties from exercising their right
to vote on account of their race, etc., it does not appear that it was
their intent to interfere with any right granted or secured by the
''At p. 552 of 92 U. S.
30At p. 553 of 92 U. S.
3'At pp. 553, 554 of 92 U. S.
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Constitution or laws of the United States. We may suspect that
'race' was the cause of the hostility; but it is not so averred.32 This
is material to the substance of the offense, and cannot be supplied
by implication.

'33

Two other counts charged an intent to deprive Nelson and
Tillman of their right to the benefit of laws of the state and the
United States equal to that enjoyed by white persons. In response
to this, the Court said: "There is no allegation that this was done
because of the race or color of the persons conspired against. When
stripped of its verbiage, the case as presented amounts to nothing
more than that the defendants conspired to prevent certain citizens
of the United States, being within the State of Louisiana, from
enjoying the equal protection of the laws of the State and of the
United States. The 14th Amendment prohibits a state from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws; but this provision does not, any more than the one which
precedes it and which we have just considered, add anything to
the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against
another. . . . Every republican government is in duty bound to
protect all its citizens in the enjoyment of this principle, if within
its power. That duty was originally assumed by the states; and it
still remains there. The only obligation resting upon the United
States is to see that the states do not deny the right. This the
34
Amendment guarantees, but no more.1
Two other counts charged an intent to intimidate and injure
Nelson and Tillman because they had voted at previous elections.
These were found subject to the same defects which had been found
to vitiate the charge of intent to prevent future voting.
There remained four counts of the indictment, the 5th, 8th, 13th
and 16th. The 5th and 13th charged an intent to interfere with
"rights, privileges, immunities and protection" to which the parties
were entitled as citizens of the United States and of Louisiana,
because they were Negroes; the 8th and 16th made like allegations
as to "rights and privileges granted and secured to them by the
Constitution and laws of the United States." There being here
no specification of any particular rights claimed to have been violated, the language was held too broad to give the accused persons
notice of the crime charged against them, in accordance with established rules of criminal pleading.
321t was averred, however, in both the counts thus disposed of, that Nelson and Tillman were Negroes.
a3At
pp. 535 and 550 of 92 U. S.
34
At p. 555 of 92 U. S.'
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The cause was remanded with instructions to discharge the
defendants. Justice Clifford concurred in the result, "but for
reasons quite different from those given by the Court." There was
no dissent.
The briefs of counsel for defendants argued against the cosstitutionality of the Enforcement Act; but this question was not
touched by the Court. Except for the conclusions that the rights
of assembly and bearing arms "for lawful purposes," the right to be
secure from unlawful violence, and the general right to vote at a
state election, were not protected against individuals by the 14th
and 15th Amendments, all that was decided was that most of the
indictment was defective. The case is of importance because of its
strong and lucid reassertion of the interpretation given the two
Amendments in the Slaughter-House35 and Reese Cases; but the
writer ventures to raise a question whether, as an authoritative precedent, it has not been considerably overworked.
"Jim Crow," in his constitutional relations, first came before
36
the Court in 1877 in Hall 's.DeCir.
A Louisiana statute, passed
in 1869, during the Reconstruction period, provided that "All persons
within this State, in the business of common carriers of passengers," may make rules covering service to passengers, "provided
said rules and regulations make no discrimination on account of
race or color." A Negro woman took passage on a steamboat engaged in interstate commerce, for transportation from New
Orleans to another point in Louisiana. She was ejected from a
cabin specially set apart for white persons, and brought an action
for damages. Her claim was sustained in the State Supreme Court,
which was reversed, Chief Justice Waite delivering the opinion.
"For the purposes of this case," it was said, "we must treat the
statute as requiring those engaged in interstate commerce to give
all persons traveling in Louisiana, upon the public conveyances
employed in such business, equal rights and privileges in all parts
of the conveyance, without distinction or discrimination on account
of race or color. Such was the construction given to that act in the
courts below, and it is conclusive on us as the construction of a
state law by the state courts..It is with this provision of the statute
alone that we have to deal. We have nothing whatever to do with
it as a regulation of internal commerce, or as affecting anything
else than commerce among the states. '3 7 It was held that the inci-Excenting the Chief Justice, all members of the Court had sat in the
Slaughter-House Cases.
-1(1877) 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. Ed. 547.
37At p. 487 of 95 U. S.
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dent was one of interstate commerce, and that under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution only Congress, and not a state legislature, could so regulate interstate commerce. How far the Court
was willing to go in order to find the incident one of interstate
commerce can be seen by the following: "While it (the statute in
question) purports only to control the carrier when engaged within
the state, it must necessarily influence his conduct to some extent
in the management of his business throughout his entire voyage.
His disposition of, passengers taken up and put down within the
state, or taken up within to be carried without, cannot but affect,
in a greater or less degree, those taken up without and brought
within, and sometimes those taken up and put down without. A
passenger in the cabin set apart for the use of whites without the
state must, when the boat comes within, share the accommodation
of that cabin with such colored persons as may come on board
afterwards, if the law is enforced." 38 . . . "No carrier of passengers

can conduct his business with satisfaction to himself, or comfort to
those employing him, if, on one side of a state line, his passengers,
both white and colored, must be permitted to occupy the same
cabin, and on the other be kept separate. Uniformity in the regulations by which he is to be governed from one end to the other of
his route is a necessity in his business, and to secure it Congress,
which is untrammeled by state lines, has been invested with the
exclusive legislative power of determining what such regulations
may be. .

.

. This power of regulation may be exercised without

legislation as well as with it. By refraining from action Congress
in effect adopts as its own regulations those which the common
law, or the civil law where that prevails, has provided for the
government of such business, and those which the states, in the
regulation of their domestic concerns, have established, affecting
commerce but not regulating it within the meaning of the Constitution. In fact, congressional action is only necessary to cure
defects in existing laws, as they are discovered, and to.adapt such
laws to new developments of trade. As was said by Mr. Justice
Field, speaking for the Court in Welton vs. Missouri, 91 U. S. 282,
'Inaction (by Congress)

. . . is equiYalent to a declaration that

interstate commerce shall remain free and untrammeled.' Applying
that principle to the circumstances of this case, congressional inaction left Benson (owner of the boat-line) at liberty to adopt
such reasonable rules and regulations for the disposition of passengers upon his boat, while pursuing his voyage in Louisiana or
38At I. 489 of 95 U. S.
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without, as seemed to him most for the interest of all concerned....
We think this statute, to the extent that it requires those engaged
in the transportation of passengers among the states to carry
colored passengers in Louisiana in the same cabin with whites, is
unconstitutional and void. If the public good requires such legislation it must come from Congress and not from the states." The
decision rested the "reasonableness" of the carrier's rule, as applied
to interstate passengers, solely on the "great inconvenience and
unnecessary hardship" 39 which would result from a contrary practice in the business of interstate transportation of passengers. There
was no dissent.

40

Federal troops were withdrawn from the "reconstructed" states
in 1877, and cases involving alleged violation of the rights of
Negroes under the 14th Amendment began to come before the
Court more frequently. Three such cases were argued in October,
1879, and decided the following January. Strauder vs. West Virginia' came up on writ of error to the Supreme Court of West
Virginia. A Negro had been convicted of murder by a jury selected
under a state law which made only white men eligible for jury
service. The opinion was by Justice Strong, Justices Clifford and
Field dissenting, and it was held that the plaintiff in error had
been deprived of the right secured to him by the 14th Amendment
to be tried by a jury selected without statutory discrimination as
to color. It was stated that the Amendment not only gave citizenship and the privileges of citizenship to persons of color, but that
it denied to any state the power to withhold from them the equal
protection of the laws, and invested Congress with power, by
appropriate legislation, to enforce its provisions. Citing the provisions of the Amendment the Court says, in words which have not
always governed the disposition of later cases,-"What is this
but declaring that the law in the states shall be the same for the
black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white,
shall stand equal before the laws of the states and, in regard to the
colored race, for whose protection the Amendment was primarily
designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by
law because of their color? The words of the Amendment, it is
true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a
:3At p. 489 of 95 U. S.
-'It is not difficult to guess what sort of a dissenting opinion Justice Harlan, who had come to the Court a month before this decision was handed
down, would have written had he taken part. See his comments in L. N. 0. &
T. Ry. Co. v. Miss., (1890) 133 U. S. 587, 592, 10 S. Ct. 348, 33 L. Ed. 784.
41(1880) 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664.

238 .

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored racethe right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them
distinctively as colored,-exemption from legal discriminations,
implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their
enjoyment of the rights others enjoy, and discriminations which
are steps toward reducing them to a: subject race. ' '42 An important
social fact, too often ignored, is pointed out in the statement that
legislation of the sort in question is "practically a brand upon them,
affixed by the law; an assertion of their inferiority, -and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to
individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to
secure to all others. 4 3
Virginia 'vs. Rives 44 was decided the same day. Though often
cited, it contains nothing further of importance to this review
except a declaration that a state may act through its executive
or judicial authorities, as well as through its legislature, in a way to
violate the Amendment. The case involved the construction of
certain sections of the United States Revised Statutes providing
for the removal to Federal Courts "of causes commenced in any
State Court... against any person who is denied or cannot enforce
in the judicial tribfinals of the state .

.

. any right secured to him

by any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizen's of the
United States." It was said that "the object of these statutes, as of
the Constitution authorizing them, was'to place the colored race,
in respect to civil rights, upon a level with whites. They made
the rights and responsibilities, civil and criminal, of the two races
exactly the same." It was held, however, that the right of removal
to a Federal Court under Section 641 of the Unitdd States Revised Statutes, which was recognized in the Strauder Case, was not
present here under the facts. Justice Strong again spoke for the
Court. Justices Field and Clifford concurred in the result but dissented from the views of the majority as to the scope and application of the Amendment.
Ex parte Virginia4 5 was also decided the same day. A county
judge in Virginia was indicted in the United States District Court
under Section 4 of the Act of March 1, 1875, making it a criminal
offense for "any officer or other person, charged with any duty
in the summoning or selection of jurors, to exclude or fail to sum42At p. 307 of 100 U. S.
43At Y. 308 of 100 U. S.

4"1(1880) 100 U. S. 313, 25 L. Ed. 667.
45(1880) 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. Ed. 676.
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mon any citizen, otherwise qualified for jury service, 'on account
of race, color or previous condition of servitude.'" It appeared that
the defendant had such duties, and the question before the Court,
considered on habeas corpus, was whether the statute was valid
under the 13th and 14th Amendments. "One great purpose of these
Amendments," said Justice Strong, again speaking for the Court,
"was to raise the colored race from that condition of inferiority
and servitude in which most of them had previously stood, into
perfect equality of civil rights with all other persons within the
jurisdiction of the states. They were intended to take away all
possibility of oppression by law because of race or color. They
were intended to be, what they really are, limitations of the power
of the states and enlargements of the power of Congress.... Whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain,
and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of
civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against state denial
or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power. ' 46 The declaration in the Rives Case that action
by other state agencies besides the legislature would- be regarded
as action by the state was made more emphatic: "Whoever, by virtue of public position under a state government, deprives another
of property, life or liberty without due process of law, or denies
or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name (of) and for the
state, and is clothed with the state's power, his act is that of the
state. '47 The writ prayed forwas accordingly denied. This decision
was the heaviest blow "state sovereignty" had suffered in many
years, and it was opposed by Justice Field in a vigorous dissenting
opinion in which Justice Clifford concurred.
The doctrine announced as above in 1880 was reaffirmed a year
later in Neal vs. Delaware. 8 Justice Harlan wrote the opinion. Its
effect was substantially this: The Constitution of Delaware adopted
in 1831, and the words of which had never been changed, gave
the right of suffrage to free white male citizens. And the statute
of the state, adopted in 1848 and never repealed, restricted the
selection of jurors to those qualified to vote at a general state
election. The legal effect of the adoption of the Amendments to the
Federal Constitution and the laws passed for their enforcement
was to annul so much of the State Constitution as was inconsistent
p. 345 of 100 U. S.
p. 347 of 100 U. S.
V5(1881) 103 U. S. 370, 26 L. Ed. 567.
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therewith, including the provision restricting suffrage to the
white rac'e. Thenceforward the jury statute was enlarged in its
operation so as to render colored citizens, otherwise qualified,
competent to serve on juries in the state courts. Although the Delaware court was sustained in its refusal of removal to a Federal
Court under Section 641 of the Revised Statutes, it was held, under
a liberal construction of the facts involved, that a motion to quash
the indictment on the ground of exclusion of Negroes from the
grand jury because of color was. improperly denied, and the judgment and verdict were set aside. The Chief Justice dissented from
the Court's view of the facts, and Justice Field from the interpretation given to the 14th and 15th Amendments. Justice Clifford,
deceased, had been succeeded by Justice Woods, appointed from
Georgia by President Hayes. In Bush vs. Kentucky 9 exclusion of
Negroes fxom grand jury service by the state was again held to be
in contravention of the 14th Amendment. Justice Field again dissented, as did the Chief Justice and Justice Gray on a point not
involving the construction of the Amendment.
In Pace'vs. Alaban45 ° provisions in the Code of Alabama
punishing adultery or fornication between persons one of whom
was of the white race and the other of the Negro race more
severely than the same crime when committed between persons
of the same color, was helot not a violation of the 14th Amendment,
since the same punishment applied to both black and white
offenders. Justice Field wrote the opinion and there was no dissent.
Section 5519 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, originally one of the sections of the Enforcement Act of April 20, 1871,
sometimes styled "the Ku Klux Act," made it a federal offense to,
conspire, etc., "for the purpose of depriving . . . any person or

class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges or immunities under the laws." In United States vs.
9
Harris
' the constitutionality'of this section was attacked, and the
Government sought to sustain it under Article IV, Section 2, of the
Constitution and the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments. It was held
that none of these provisions covered the offense defined in the
section, since no action of the State of Tennessee was involved, and
the acts 'prohibited were equally criminal whether committed
,against white or colored persons. Justice Woods wrote the opinion.
Justice Harlan dissented without a written opinion.
49(1883) 107 U. S. 110, 1 S. Ct. 625,27 L. Ed. 354.
•o(1883) 106 U. S. 583, 1 S. Ct. 637, 27 L. Ed. 207.
51(1883) 106 U. S. 629, 1 S. Ct. 601, 27 L. Ed. 290.
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Hardly less a landmark in our field than The Slaughter-House
Cases is The Civil Rights Cases.52 Five cases, coming up from
Kansas, California, Missouri, New York and Tennessee, composed
the group which were considered and decided together in October,
1883. Section 1 of an Act of Congress "to Protect all Citizens in
their Civil and Legal Rights," passed March 1, 1875, was as follows :-Section 1: "That all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of
the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns,
public conveyances on land and water, theaters, and other places of
public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations
established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and
color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude." Section 2
provided penalties for violation of Section 1. The New York case
involved discrimination in an opera house against a person whose
color was not stated; the others, discrimination against colored
persons,-two in hotels, another in a theater, and the fourth on a
railway train. In each instance the violation was charged against
a person or corporation, with no claim of authority under state
legislation. The common question presented was whether the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 was authorized under the last three Amendments to the Constitution. The Court, by Justice Bradley, carefully limiting its decision so as to cover nothing else, held that
Sections 1 and 2 of the Act were unconstitutional in their application to such incidents as those complained of. The legislation
authorized by the 14th Amendment is declared not to be "direct
legislation on the matters respecting which the states are prohibited
from making or enforcing certain laws, or doing certain acts, but
corrective legislation, such as may be necessary or proper for
counteracting and redressing the effect of such laws or acts." It
was further held that though the 13th Amendment, "by its reflex
action, establishes universal freedom in the United States, and
Congress may probably pass laws directly enforcing its provisions,"
such action as is covered by the sections in question "imposes no
badge of slavery or involuntary servitude upon the party," and
does not come within the field of congressional legislation by virtue
of the 13th Amendment, "but at most infringes rights which are
protected from state aggression by the 14th Amendment. 51 3 "It
would be running the slavery argument into the ground," said
the Court, "to make it apply to every act of discrimination which
5*2(1883) 109 U. S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835.
•3This language is taken from Headnote 3 of the official syllabus.
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a person may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or
as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit
to his concert or theater, or deal with in other matters of intercourse
or business. .

.

.If the laws themselves make any unjust discrimi-

nation, amenable to the prohibitions of the 14th Amendment, Congress has full power to afford a remedy, under that Amendment
''5 4
and in accordane with it.
Justice Harlan alone dissented; 5

and in a powerful argument which should be read in full by every
American interested in that vitally important national problem
which is sometimes styled "the Negro question," he develops the
thesis set forth in the opening sentence of his opinion: "Constitutional provisions adopted in the interest of liberty, and for the
purpose of securing through national legislation, if need be, rights
inhering in a state of freedom, and belonging to American citizenship, have been so construed-as to defeat the ends the people desired
to accomplish, which they attempted to accomplish, and which they
supposed they had accomplished by changes in their fundamental
law." This result, reached "by a subtle and ingenious verbal
criticism," he attacked under "the familiar rule requiring, in the interpretation of constitutional provisions, that full effect be given
to the intent with which they were adopted."5 6
In considering this decision its reservations seem hardly less
important than its conclusions. Besides that implied in Headnote 3
quoted above, the following paragraphs appear in the official
syllabus of the case: "4. Whether the accommodations and privileges sought to be protected by the 1st and 2nd sections of the
Civil Rights Act, are or are not rights constitutionally demandable;
and if they are in what form they are to be protected, is not now
decided. .

.

. 5. Nor is it decided whether the law as it stands

is operative in the Territories and District of Columbia-the decision only relating to its validity as applied to the states .... 6. Nor

is it decided whether Congress under the commercial power, may
or may not pass a law securing to all persons equal accommodations on lines of public conveyance between two or more states."
Ex parte Yarborough57 was decided in March, 1884. Yarborough and others had been convicted in the United States Circuit
Court for the Northern District of Georgia upon indictments drawn
5*At pp. 24, 25 of 109 U. S.
55The Court was composed of the following members, all appointed by
Republican Presidents: Chief Justice Waite and Justice Blatchford, Bradley,
Field, Gray, Harlan, Matthews, Miller, and Woods.
56At p. 26 of 109 U. S.
57(1884) 110 U. S. 651, 4 S. Ct. 152, 28 L. Ed. 274.
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under Sections 55085" and 5520 of the Revised Statutes. They applied to the Supreme Court for habeas corpus, which was denied.
The charges were conspiracy to injure, etc., a citizen in the exercise
of a right secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and to prevent him by force from voting at an
election for member of Congress, offenses specified in the two
sections. The terms of both sections are general, no reference being
made to race, color or previous condition of servitude. It was
alleged in the indictments that Saunders, the object of the conspiracy, was a Negro, and that the acts complained of were done
because of this fact. The decision, however, -was not based on discrimination, but on the implied power of Congress to safeguard the
election of officials of the National Government. Justice Miller
wrote the opinion and there was no dissent. The following November, in United States vs. Waddell, 9 Section 5508 was held to apply
to a conspiracy to prevent a person from completing a homestead
entry. The record does not specifically show that a Negro was in60
volved, but the circumstances leave little doubt of that fact.
IV.
CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER

The "Commerce Clause" of the Constitution on which the
Court had rested its decision in Hall vs. DeCuir,61 came up again in
L. N. 0. & T. Ry. Co. vs. Mississippi.62 A Mississippi statute required railways operating within the state to provide (Sec. 1) separate but equal accommodations for white and colored passengers,
and to enforce (Sec. 2) the segregation thus provided for. Section
3 fixed penalties for non-compliance. The railway company was
prosecuted and convicted for violation of Section 1. The Supreme
Court of Mississippi bad construed the statute as relating only to
commerce within the state. This construction was held conclusive,
and so construed the statute was held not unconstitutional. The
opinion by Justice Brewer includes the following language: "This
is not a civil action brought by an individual to recover damages
'-Substantiallv the same as Section 6, Act of May 31, 1870. See U. S. v.
Avery, supra, p. 227. The summary character of the earlier decision is especially noteworthy by contrast, in view of the fact that in the instant case the
Court had indicated that it must deny the writ on other grounds before it took
up the constitutional question presented by the record.
59(1884) 112 U. S.76, 5 S. Ct. 35, 28 L. Ed. 673.
'30The case came up from Arkansas on a certificate of division of opinion.

OtSee p. 235,
62(1890)

supra.

133 U. S. 587, 10 S.Ct. 348, 33 L. Ed. 784.
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for being compelled to occupy one particular compartment, or
prevented from riding on the train; and hence there is no question
of personal insult or alleged violation of personal rights. The
question is limited to the power of the state to compel railroad
companies to provide within the state separate accommodations for
the two races. Whether such accommodation is to be a matter of
choice or compulsion does not enter into the case .... No question

arises under this section as to the power of the state to separate
in different compartments interstate passengers, or to affect in any
manner the privileges and rights of such passengers. All that we
can consider is whether the state has the power to require that
railroad trains within her limits shall have separate accommodations for the two races." 63 Hall vs. DeCuirwas distinguished b" the
fact that in that case the Supreme Court had recognized the act as
invalid, because it undertook to regulate interstate commerce, while
the instant case was limited to operations within the state. Notwithstanding the carefully guarded language of this decision Justice
Harlan dissented. He maintained that if the Court's reasoning was
sound in the earlier case it was equally applicable here. "I am unable
to perceive," he said, "how the former (i. e., the Louisiana statute)
is a regulation of interstate commerce and the other (i. e., the Mississippi statute) is not." 64 Justice Bradley concurred in the dissent.65
Wood vs. Brnsh66 was an appeal from a judgment in the U. S.
Circuit Court, South District of New York, denying a writ of
habeas corpus. The appellant was a Negro, convicted of murder,
who claimed discrimination by which citizens of the African race
were excluded from the juries by which he was indicted and tried.
The laws of New York made no such discrimination, but it was
alleged to have been made by the officials who selected the jury
lists. It was held that the conclusions of the trial court on this point
could not be reviewed on habeas corpus. Justice Harlan wrote the
opinion and Justice Field concurred in the result, but- repeated his
63At pp. 589, 591 of 133 U. S.
64At p. 594 of 133 U. S.
65
Ten years later this case was followed in a closely parallel case, C. &
0. Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, (1900) 179 U. S. 388, 21 S. Ct. 101, 45 L. Ed. 244
(opinion by Brown, J., Harlan, J., dissenting). See also So. Covington &
Cinn. St. Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, (1920) 252 U. S.399, 40 S.Ct. 378, 64 L. Ed.
631, and C. C. & E. Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, (1920) 252 U. S.408, 40 S.Ct. 381,
64 L. Ed. 637. These cases were decided by a divided Court on a rather complicated state of facts, the majority holding that in view of the relations between the leasing and operating corporations the Kentucky Separate Coach
Law, as applied to the acts charged in the indictment, did not constitute an
unreasonable regulation of interstate commerce. No point of law germane to
this inquiry was determined.
66(1891) 140 U. S.278, 11 S.Ct. 738, 35 L. Ed. 505.
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dissent, as in Neal vs. Delaware,67 from the constitutional views expressed or implied in Justice Harlan's opinion. 68
Section 5508 of the Revised Statutes was again before the Court
in Logan vs. United States" decided in April, 1892, and was construed to cover an offense against the right of a citizen of the United
States, in the custody of a United States Marshal under a lawful
commitment to answer for an offense against the United States, to be
protected from mob violence. The offense charged against the persons
assaulted was larceny in the Indian country, within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States. It does not appear in the record
that these men (two of whom were murdered) were Negroes, but
the case was of great importance to members of the Negro race in
view of the prevalence of extreme mob violence against them in
certain portions of the South. In the opinion by Justice Gray
United States vs. Reese, United States vs. Cruikshank, Strauder vs.
West Virginia, Ex parte Virginia, United States vs. Harris, the
Civil Rights Cases, Ex parte Yarborough, and United States vs.
Waddell°0 were reviewed and interpreted as follows: "The whole
scope and effect of this series of decisions is that, while certain
fundamental rights, recognized and declared, but not granted or
created, in some of the Amendments to the Constitution, are
thereby guaranteed only against violation or abridgment by the
United States, or by the states, as the case may be, and cannot
therefore be affirmatively enforced by Congress against unlawful
acts of individuals; yet that every right, created by, arising under,
or dependent upon the Constitution of the United States may be
protected and enforced by Congress by such means and in such
manner as Congress, in the exercise of the correlative duty of protection, or of the legislative powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, may in its discretion deem most eligible and best adapted
to attain the object." 7' It is held, however, that: "In the case at
bar the right in question does not depend on any of the Amendments to the Constitution, but arises out of the creation and establishment by the Constitution itself of a national government, paramount and supreme within its sphere of action. Any government
which has power to indict, try and punish for crime, and to arrest
the accused and hold them in safekeeping until trial, must have the
67

See p. 239, supra.
48See Andrews v. Swartz, (1895) 156 U. S. 272, 15 S. Ct. 389, 39 L. Ed.
422, a unanimous decision holding that habeas corpus was not the proper
remedy.
- (1892) 144 U. S. 263, 12 S. Ct. 617, 36 L. Ed. 429.
7oSee pp. 230, 231, 237, 238, 240, 241, 242, 243, supra.
7lAt p. 293 of 144 U. S.
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power and the duty to protect against unlawful interference its
prisoners so held, as well as its executive and judicial officers
charged with keeping them and trying them.

' 72

On account of

errors at the trial the conviction in the lower court (U. S. Circuit
Court, Northern District of Texas) was set aside and a new trial
ordered. Justice Lamar dissented from the construction given to
Section 5508.
In Gibson vs. Mississippi,73 Neal vs. Delaware74 was followed in

holding that R. S., Section 641 did not warrant the removal from a
state to a Federal Cohurt on the ground that jury commissioners,
without authority derived from the constitution and laws of the
state, had excluded colored citizens from juries on account of their
race. The conviction in the state court was affirmed; but Justice
Harlan, speaking for the unanimous court, took occasion to reaffirm the constitutional principles announced in the Neal Case.
Justice Field, though still a member of the Court, did not note a
dissent. The Gibson Case was followed in Smith vs. Mississippi,5
76
decided the same day, and in Murray vs. Lousiana.
In the Smith
Case (opinion by Justice Harlan)- it was held that although the
motion to quash was verified by the affidavits of the defendants,
this alone, without other evidence or offer of evidence, did not
entitle the motion to consideration. On this point the case was fol77
lowed in Tarrancevs. Florida,
Justice Brewer writing the opinion
and Justice Harlan taking no part, and in Martin vs. Texas,"8 in
which Justice Harlan wrote the opinion.
I To champions of the Negro race against discriminations by
whites, Plessy vs. Ferg11son,79 was a crushing blow. The Court was
composed of six justices appointed by Republican presidents and
three by President Cleveland. A Negro ('Vs Caucasian and Y8 African blood), while a railway passenger between local points in
Louisiana, was ejected from a coach reserved for whites and
prosecuted for. forcible resistance. A Louisiana statute provided
that a railway carrying passengers within the state must provide
"equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored
races" by separate coaches or partitions; and that no persons
should be "permitted to occupy seats in coaches other than the
72At p. 294 of 144 U. S.
73(1896) 162 U. S. 565, 16 S. Ct. 904, 40 L. Ed. 1075.
74See p. 239, supra.
75(1896) 162 U. S. 592, 16 S. Ct. 900, 40 L. Ed. 1082.
76(1896) 163 U. S. 101, 16 S. Ct. 990, 41, L. Ed. 87.

77(1903) 188 U. S. 519,

23 S. Ct. 402, 47 L. Ed. 572.
78(1906) 200 U. S. 316, 26 S. Ct. 338, 50 L. Ed. 497.

79(1896) 163 U. S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256.
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ones assigned to them on account of the race they belong to."
Stringent provisions for the enforcement of the policy were incorporated in the statute. The right of the state to enact this sort of
legislation was for the first time squarely before the Court and was
decided in the affirmative. Justice Brown spoke for the Court
(Justice Brewer did not sit in the case), and Justice Harlan alone
dissented. The arguments on both sides are stated in terms which,
half a century afterward, are still so familiar in the discussion of
questions of segregation that it seems of interest to quote them
rather freely. Said Justice Brown: "A statute which implies merely
a legal distinction between the white and colored races-a distinction which is founded on the color of the two races, and which must
always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other
race by color-has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of
the two races, or re-establish a state of involuntary servitude. Indeed, we do not understand that the Thirteenth Amendment is
strenuously relied on by the plaintiff in error in this connection....
The object of the (14th) Amendment was undoubtedly to enforce
the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the
nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinction based on color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from
political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms
unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring their
separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact
do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other,
and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within
the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their
police power. The most common instance of this is connected with
the establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which have been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative
power even by states where the political rights of the colored race
have been longest and most earnestly enforced."8 0 "So far, then,
as a conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the case
reduces itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana is
a reasonable regulation, and with respect to this there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the legislature. In determining the question of reasonableness, it is at liberty to act with
reference to the established usages, customs and traditions of the
people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the
preservation of the public peace and good order. Gauged by this
N'At pp. 543, 544 of 163 U. S. Eight cases are cited, all from state courts
except Bertonneau v. School Directors, (C. Ct. La. Dist. 1878) 3 Woods 177.
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standard we cannot say that the act in question is unreasonable or
more obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the Acts of
Congress requiring separate schools for colored children in the
District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which does not seem
to have been questioned, or the corresponding acts of the state
legislatures. .

.

.We consider the underlying fallacy of the plain-

tiff's argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of
inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the
Act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. The argument necessarily assumes that if, as
has been more than once the case, and is not unlikely to be so again,
the colored race should become the dominant power in the state
legislature, and should enact a law in precisely similar terms, it
could thereby relegate the white race to an inferior position. We
imagine that the white race, at least, would not acquiesce in this
assumption. The argument also assumes that social prejudices may
be overcome by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured
to the Negro except by an enforced commingling of the two races.
We cannot accept this proposition. If the two races are to meet on
terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities,
a mutual appreciation of each other's merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals." 81
The Court seems to have interpreted the broad lahguage of
Straudervs. West Virginia" and other like decisions to cover only
"civil" and "political" rights (not defined), and to have classed
the right of the plaintiff in error to choose his seat in a railway
train without discrimination on the ground of race or color as a
"social" right (also undefined), not covered by the 14th Amendment. Yick Wo vs. Hopkins83 was recognized as holding that exercises of the police power must be reasonable. In that case, it should
be noted, the standard was found in essential justice; here, in the
local "usages, customs and traditions."
Referring to the Louisiana statute justice Brown says: "Similar statutes for the separation of the two races upon public conveyances were held constitutional in West Chester and P. R.R. Co.
vs. Miles, 55 Pa. 209" and eleven other cases cited. The statement,
however, is not supported by any one of the citations. Having made
so bold an assertion the writer feels compelled to maintain it by
8At pp. 550, 551 of 163 U. S.
82

See p. 237, szpra.

83 (1886) 118 U. S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220.
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summaries of the cases, believing the space thus required to be
justified by the great importance of the decision. The Pennsylvania
case was a common law action and did not in any way involve a
statute or a constitutional point. It was decided before the ratification of the 14th Amendment and turned upon the reasonableness of separation under a regulation of the carrier. The majority
rested its conclusion chiefly on divine law,-"the law of races
established by the Creator himself." However, between the occurrence of the facts out of which the case arose and the date of
the decision the Pennsylvania legislature had flown in the face of
Providence by passing the Act of March 22, 1867, forbidding all
distinctions between passengers on account of race or color. Day
vs. Owen8 4 was decided in 1858. In Chicago & N. W. R. Co. vs.
Williams,"' 1870, no constitutional question was raised or discussed. The discrimination at issue was found unlawful and an
award of damages sustained. Chesapeake, 0. & S. R. Co. vs.
Wells80 is a very summary decision under the state statute, and no
constitutional question is referred to. In People vs. King"7 the act
complained of was the exclusion of Negroes from a place of public
amusement; and on the authority of Mann vs. Illinois18 Strauder
9
Ex parte Virginia9 and Virginia vs. Rives,91 a convs. Virginia,"
viction under the New York Penal Code forbidding such discrimination was sustained, in the light of the war Amendments, as
a valid exercise of the police power, against attack upon the statute
as an unconstitutional interference with the lawful use of private
property. Justice Peckham, who was then a member of the New
York Court of Appeals, and who voted with the majority in the
Plessy Case, dissented without opinion. The Sue,92 in admiralty,
involved transportation on a steamer employed in public navigable
waters between points in Maryland and Virginia. "It is therefore," the court said, "a matter which cannot be regulated by state
law, and Congress having refrained from legislating on the subject, the owners of the boat are left at liberty to adopt in reference
thereto such reasonable regulations as the common law allows
(citing Hall vs. DeCuir93 ). One of the restrictions which the com84(1858) 5 Mich. 520
s-(1870) 55 Ill. 185.
86(1887) 85 Tenn. 613.
87(1888) 110 N.Y. 418.

ss(1877) 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77.
89See p. 237, supra.
90See p. 238, supra.
O'See p. 238, supra.
92 (Dist. Ct. Mde. 1885) 22 Fed. 843.
03See p. 235, mupra.
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mon law imposes is that such regulations must be reasonable and
tend to the comfort and safety of passengers generally, and that
accommodations equal in comfort and safety must be afforded to
all alike who pay the same price." It was held that in the case at
bar the accommodations afforded to a Negro were inferior, and
damages were awarded. Logwood vs. Memphis & C. R. Co.,9 4 involving intrastate transportation, consists of a charge to a jury, and
the court announced that it adopted the Sue Case as a proper statement of the law. McGuinn vs. Forbes95 was an action in admiralty
involving transportation on a steamer from Maryland to Virginia,
and Was based on mistreatment of libelant, a Negro who is described by the court as "a "well-behaved, educated niinister of the
Christian religion," by other passengers in a dining-room. It was
claimed that the officers of the boat made no proper effort to protect
him. The Sue Case was cited and there was no constitutional
question. The court said: "There is some ground for a suspicion
that the petitioner was not sufficiently protected by the officers
of the steamboat from the threats and indignities at the hands of
certain passengers, but the proof fails to establish it, and they
testified they did all they could to prevent it. I therefore must dismiss the libel, but without costs." Houck vs. So. Pac. R. Co." was
a suit for damages by an intrastate passenger for ejection from a
car reserved for white people. The court said: "The undisputed
evidence in the case shows that Mrs. Houck is a young married
woman with some degree of Negro blood in her veins; that casually
looking at her and her husband it would be difficult to distinguish
either of them from white persons; that she is a graduate of one of
the high-schools in Texas where colored persons are educated for
school teaching." The opinion is taken up with a description of the
poor condition of the car into which she was ordered to go, the
treatment she received from the brakeman and conductor, and
other circumstances of her journey. There was no discussion of
any question of law. On the facts there was an award of both
exemplary and actual damages. In Heard vs. Georgia Railroad
Company9 7 it was held that the petitioner (again a Negro clergyman) was deprived of equal accommodations in violation of Section 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act.9 8 The same result was
94

(Cir. Ct. W. D. Tenn. 1885) 23 Fed. 318.
95(Dist.
Ct. Mde. 1889) 37 Fed. 639.
96 (Cir. Ct. W. D. Tex. 1888) 38 Fed. 226.
97(1888) 1 I. C. C. R. 428.
9
sSee Mitchell v. U. S., at p. 286, infra.
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reached in Heard vs. Georgia Railroad Company9 9 on facts arising
out of another interstate journey of the same man over the same
railway. In the earlier case the railway company was ordered "to
furnish for all passengers paying the same fare cars in all respects
equal." This time it was ordered to do so "without any further
delay."
Discussing the general scope of the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments, Justice Harlan said: "These notable additions to the fundamental law were welcomed by the friends of liberty throughout the
world. They removed the race line from our governmental systems. They had, as this Court has said, a common purpose, namely,
to secure 'to a race recently emancipated . . . all the civil rights
that the superior race enjoy.' They declared, in legal effect, this
Court has further said, 'that the law in the states shall be the
same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the states, and,
in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the Amendments are primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be
made against them by law because of their color.' We also said
'The words of the Amendment ... contain a necessary implication
of a . . . right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against
them distinctively as colored-exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security
of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps toward reducing them to the condition of a subject race .... The white race deems itself to be the
dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not that
it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.
But in the view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there
is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.
There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil
rights all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the
peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and
takes no account of his surroundings or his color when his civil
rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.
It is therefore to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final
expositor of the fundamental law of the land, has reached the
99 (1889) 3 I. C. C. R. 111.
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conclusion that it is competent for a state to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of race.
In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove
to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in
The Dred Scott Case. . . .The present decision, it may well be
apprehended, will not only stimulate aggressions, more or less
brutal and irritating, upon the admitted rights of colored citizens,
but will encourage the belief that it is possible, by means of state
enactments, to defeat the beneficent purposes which the people
of the United States had in view when they adopted the recent
Amendments of the Constitution. .

.

. Sixty millions of whites

are in no danger from the presence here of eight millions of blacks.
The destinies of the two races in this country are indissolubly linked
together, and the interests of both require that the common government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted
under sanction of law. What can more certainly arouse race hate
. . . than state enactments which in fact proceed on the ground

that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens.
That, as all will admit, is the real meaning of such legislation as
was enacted in Louisiana. .

.

. It is scarcely just to say that a

colored citizen should not object to occupying a public coach assigned to his own race. He does not object, nor, perhaps, would he
object to separate coaches for his race, if his rights under the law
were recognized. But he objects, and ought never to cease objecting, to the proposition that citizens of the white and black
races can be adjudged criminals because they sit, or claim the
right to sit, in the same public coach, on a public highway .... The

thin disguise of 'equal' accommodations for passengers in railroad
coaches will not mislead anyone, or atone for the wrong this day
done." 00
Whether the conclusions of the majority in this case, which
has meant so much to our Negro fellow-citizens, were right or
wrong, the cynical and superficial character of the opinion cannot
escape notice; and it is disturbing to find that for fifty years it has
stood as an authoritative precedent, without direct criticism in the
Court except from Justice Harlan. The language of the Court's
unanimous opinion in the recent Mitchell Case'0 shows quite a
different spirit, although the prevailing construction of the 14th
Amendment is not questioned.
10OAt pp. 555, 559-562 of 163 U. S.
0
0' Mitchell v. U. S., (1941) 313 U. S. 80, 61 S. Ct. 873. 85 L. Ed. 1201.
at p. 286, infra.
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The question of a Negro's rights in the selection of jurors to
try him was again before the Court in Williams vs. Mississippi.°2
It was held therein that certain provisions of the constitution and
code of Mississippi, "do not, on their face, discriminate between
the white and Negro races, and do not amount to a denial of the
equal protection of the law, secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution; and it has not been shown that their
actual administration was evil, but only that evil was possible
under them." Under the constitution of the state one had to be
an elector and have his .taxes fully paid in order to be eligible
as a juror; and it was alleged that the constitution and laws were
framed and administered with the purpose of excluding Negroes
from voting. The Court, by McKenna, J., quoted as follows from
the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in a prior case cited by eounsel,
in reference to the convention which framed the state constitution
of 1890: "Within the field of permissible action under the limitations imposed by the Federal Constitution the (state constitutional)
convention swept the circle of expedients to obstruct the exercise
of the franchise by the Negro race .... By reason of its previous
condition of servitude and dependence this race had acquired or
accentuated certain peculiarities of habit, of temperament and
of character, which clearly distinguished it, as a race, from that
of the whites,-a patient, docile people, but careless, landless and
migratory within narrow limits, without forethought, and its
criminal members given rather to furtive offenses than to the
robust crimes of the whites. Restrained by the Federal Constitution from discriminating against the Negro race, the convention
discriminated against its characteristics and the offenses to which
its weaker members were prone" (the reference here being to
crimes for which conviction was a constitutional disqualification
for the ballot,-"bribery, burglary, forgery, embezzlement or
bigamy"). On this Justice McKenna's comment was: "But nothing
tangible can be deduced from this. If weakness were the test
taken advantage of, it was done 'within the field of permissible
action under the limitations imposed by the Federal Constitution,'
and the means of it were the alleged characteristics of the Negro
race, not the administration of the law by the officers of the state.
Besides, the operation of the (state) constitution and laws is not
limited to their language or effects on one race. They reach weak
and vicious white men as well as weak and vicious black men, and
whatever is sinister in their intention, if anything, can be prevented
102(1898) 170 U. S. 213, 18 S. Ct. 583, 42 L. Ed. 1012.
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by both races by the exertion of that duty which voluntarily pays
taxes and refrains from crime."' 1 3 Another aspect of the case involved a question of fact as to the manner in which the grand jury
had been selected. There had been a motion in the trial court to
quash the indictment on the ground that there was discrimination
resulting in the exclusion of Negroes, and that thereby the defendant was deprived of the equal protection of the laws. This
motion was supported by affidavits, and it does not appear that
these were met by counter-affidavits. The motion was denied and
the denial was assigned as error. The Court said: "We gather
from the statements of the motion that certain officers are vested
with discretion in making up lists of electors and that this
discretion can and has been exercised against the colored race, and
from these lists jurors are selected. The Supreme Court of Mississippi, however, decided in a case presenting the same questions
as the one at bar, 'that jurors are not selected from or with reference to any lists furnished by such election officers.' "1.04 Williams,
a Negro indicted and 'convicted by all-white juries, was therefore
remanded to be duly hanged. Study of the cases will disclose a
growing contrast between the Court's attitude here toward the
crucial question of fact, and that taken in later cases.
0 5
Cumming vs. County Board of Education'
was the first case
calling for the application of the 14th Amendment to the compulsory separation of white and Negro children in the public
schools. 10 1 The case has been cited several times as though it were
an authority for such separation.10 7 The Court declared, however,
by Justice Harlan: "It was said at the argument that the vice in
the common school system of Georgia was the requirement that the
white and colored children of the state be educated in separate
schools. But we need not consider that question in this case. No
such issue was made in the pleadings."' 0 The case involved only
the equality of the provisions made in separate schools. In brief,
a school board had suspended support of a high school for colored
children for the purpose of using the building for instruction in
tle lower grades, and without making other provision for high
school instruction for Negroes; while it had continued two "white"
high schools. The trial court entered an order restraining the board
1O3At p. 222 of 170 U. S.
1O4At p. 223 of 170 U. S.

105 (1889) 175 U. S. 528, 20 S. Ct. 197, 44 L. Ed. 262.
' 0 The comments on this question in Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, p. 246,
were 0nlainly dicta.
' TSee the Gong Lum and Gaines Cases, infra, pp. 271, 282.
lOSAt p. 543 of 175 U. S.
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from using public funds for the support of a white high school in
the county until it should make equal provision for colored children. The state Supreme Court reversed, and the correctness of
this reversal was the point considered on appeal. The action of the
board was held to be within its lawful discretion, Justice Harlan
concluding his opinion as follows: "While all admit that the benefits and burdens of public taxation must be shared by citizens without discrimination against any class on account of their race, the
education of people in schools maintained by state taxation is a
matter belonging to the respective states, and any interference on
the part of Federal authority -with the management of such schools
cannot be justified except in the case of a clear and unmistakable
law of the land. We
disregard of rights secured by the supreme
10 9
have here no such case to be determined."'
The detailed recital of proceedings in the Georgia courts,
showing careful consideration there, and Justice Harlan's consistently liberal attitude upon constitutional questions involving
the rights of Negroes, must predispose fair-minded persons to conclude that the case was rightly decided; but in view of the great
importance of the question of discrimination in the public schools,
and (as the writer believes) the inconclusive treatment it has thus
far received in Supreme Court decisions, it is thought appropriate
to quote from an acute criticism of this case found in an editorial
note on "Legality of Race Segregation in EducationalInstitutions,"
in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review :110 "A Negro high
school was discontinued because of lack of funds, it being claimed
that the money was needed to teach the Negroes in the lower grades.
Although the high school for white pupils was maintained with
all the usual accommodations, the court refused to order 'white'
funds to be used for colored schools, and said that . . . 'if it ap-

peared that the board's refusal to maintain such a school was in
fact an abuse of discretion and in hostility to the colored population
because of their race, different questions might have arisen in the
state court.' Here is a new test: Not mere factual inequality but
inequality motivated by race hostility. The test is not sound. What
other reason could be given for reducing only the facilities of the
Negro except that the board believed his rights inferior, his educational needs less important? To the argument that they could
not afford a Negro high school logic, constitutional theory and
justice answer: that which you cannot afford for Negroes you
109At p.545 of 175 U. S.
11082 Univ. of Pa. Law Rev. 157, 162 (1933).
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cannot afford for white pupils either.... The manner in which the
Supreme Court of the United States has handled the few cases
on the subject which it has been asked to consider, and its analysis,
implying that equality between races is a matter of 'discretion'
with state authorities, and inequality justified so long as it is not
'hostile,' are most unsatisfactory."
11
While Maxwell vs. Doe'
did not involve a Negro, it was
of such importance that it cannot be overlooked in this review. It
made clear the position of the Court on a point which, even if already covered by its decisions, was still so uncertain as to be repeatedly presented. The point is thus stated by Justice Peckham,
who wrote the opinion: "It is now urged in substance that all the
provisions contained in the first ten amendments, so far as they
secure and recognize the fundamental rights of the individual as
against the exercise of Federal power, are by virtue of this Amendment (the 14th) to be regarded as privileges and immunities of a
citizen of the United States, and therefore the states cannot provide for any procedure in state courts which could not be followed
in a Federal Court because of the limitations contained in those
Amendments." After a careful review of the Slaughter-House and
later cases the Court refused to accept this view. Justice Harlan,
true to convictions which he had often expressed during his more
than twenty years' service in the Court, concluded his dissenting
opinion as follows: "If I do not wholly misapprehend the scope
and legal effect of the present decision, the Constitution of the
United States does not stand in the way of any state striking down
guaranties of life and liberty that English-speaking people have for
centuries regarded as vital to personal security, and which the men
of the revolutionary period universally claimed as the birthright
of freemen."

12

In Carter vs. Texas"1' a motion was made in the trial court to
quash the indictment on the ground of discrimination in the drawing of grand jurors, "fully and specifically alleged," said Justice
Gray, "with almost the precision of a plea in abatement," accompanied with an offer of proof. The court refused to hear evidence and denied the motion. On a second hearing in the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals this was acknowledged to be error, but
because neither the motion nor the bill of exceptions named the
witnesses by whom it was proposed to prove the alleged discrimina111(1900) 176 U. S. 581, 20 S. Ct. 448, 44 L. Ed. 597.
11At p. 617 of 176 U. S.
113(1900) 177 U. S. 442, 20 S. Ct. 687,44 L. Ed. 839.
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tions the lower court was sustained. The Supreme Court reversed
the judgment below and remanded the case.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. vs. Kentucky 4 was another prosecution of a railway company for failure to furnish separate coaches
for white and colored passengers, as required by the Kentucky
statute. The terms of the statute need not here be set forth in
detail. It was upheld by the Kentucky Court of Appeals as applicable only to traffic within the state, and that court said:
"If it were conceded (which it is not) that the statute is invalid
as to interstate passengers, the proper construction to be given
it would then be that the legislature did not so intend it, but only
intended it to apply to transportation within the state, and therefore it would be held valid as to such passengers." Justice Brown,
in sustaining the Kentucky court, said: "We are by no means satisfied that the Court of Appeals did not give the correct construction
to -this-statute-in limiting-its operation to- domestic commerce....
The Court of Appeals has found such to be the intention of the
General Assembly in this case, or, at least, that if such were not
its intention the law may be supported as applying alone to domestic commerce. In thus holding the act to be severable, it is
laying down a principle of construction from which there is no
appeal." 5 Justice Harlan dissented without opinion. The Supreme
Court cases relied on in support of this decision were Hall vs.
De Cuir, Louisville N. 0. & T. R. R. Co. vs. Mississippi, and
Plessy vs. Ferguson, which have already been discussed herein.
The case may well be studied in connection with Chiles vs. C. &
116
0. Ry. Co.
In Brownfield vs. South Carolina1" a Negro was convicted of
murder on an indictment found by an all-white grand jury in a
county where, it was alleged in a motion to quash, four-fifths of
the population and registered voters were Negroes, all of whom
were excluded from jury service on account of race and color.
Through irregularities in the record, so extreme as to make it
difficult to believe that they were not due either to gross incompetence, indifference or collusion on the part of defendant's
counsel, the real issue was not brought before the Court, and
Justice Holmes was compelled to say: "The case involves ques114(1900) 179 U. S. 388, 21 S. Ct. 101, 45 L. Ed. 244.
"x'At
p. 394 of 179 U. S.
6
1"
See p. 264, nfra.
117(1903) 189 U. S. 426, 23 S. Ct. 513, 47 L. Ed. 882.
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tions of the gravest character, but we must deal with it according
to the record and the record discloses no wrong."118
Giles vs. Harris'" was a case from Alabama in which, as summarized by Justice Frankfurter in Lane vs. Wilson, 120 "a bill in
equity was brought by a colored man on behalf of himself 'and
on behalf more than five thousand Negroes, citizens of the county
of Montgomery, Alabama, similarly situated,' which in effect asked
the federal court 'to supervise the voting in that state by officers
of the Court.'" The bill was dismissed on demurrer in the U. S.
Circuit Court for want of jurisdiction. Justice Holmes, writing
the opinion, held that no equitable relief could be given, but was
"not prepared to say that an action at law could not be sustained
on the facts alleged in the bill."''
Justices Brewer, Brown and
Harlan dissented, Justice Brewer considering that the Circuit
Court had jurisdiction to give some relief, and Justice Harlan, that
such relief was "in respect to plaintiff's right to be registered as a
voter."
Section 5507 of the Revised Statutes of the United States
provided as follows: "Every person who prevents, hinders, controls or intimidates another from exercising, or in exercising, the
right of suffrage, to whom that right is guaranteed by the Fifteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United Staes, by means of
bribery or threats of depriving such person of employment or
occupation, or of ejecting such person from a rented house, lands
or other property, or by threats of refusing to renew leases or
contracts for labor, or by threats of violence to himself or family,
shall be punished," etc. The very terms of the statute reflect practices which notoriously prevailed in certain states. In James vs.
Bowman122 appellees were indicted for bribery of certain Negroes
at a .Congressional election in Kentucky. It was held that as legislation under Section 2 of the 15th Amendment, the statute was
unconstitutional, since Section 1 prohibited only action by a state
or the United States; also that it could not be sustained under the
general power of Congress in respect to the election of its members, since, following U. S. vs. Re'ese,' 23 its terms could not be thus
judicially limited. Justice Brewer wrote the decision; Justices
Harlan and Brown dissented.
1l8At p. 429 of 189 U. S.
119(1903) 189 U. S. 475, 23 S. Ct. 639, 47 L. Ed. 909.
120 See infra, p. 284.
12lAt p. 485 of 189 U. S.
122(1903) 190 U. S. 127, 23 S. Ct. 678, 47 L. Ed. 979.
1-3See p. 230, sutpra.
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In Rogers vs. Alabama2 4 another Negro convicted of murder
sought to attack the indictment by a motion to quash on the ground
of unconstitutional discrimination in the selection of grand jurors.
The trial court struck out the motion, and the state appellate court
sustained this action on the ground of prolixity! Justice Holmes
went behind this pretext and reversed under Carter vs. TexasY.25
Giles vs. Teasley 12 can hardly be briefly summarized. There
were two cases, one an action for damages and the other seeking
mandamus. In the former the loser in Giles vs. Harris,sought to
follow out Justice Holmes' hint that he might fare better in an
action at law than in equity. The statement of facts in the complaint (admitted upon demurrer) by Justice Day may well be
read in full as disclosing one of the ingenious methods resorted to
in certain states to disfranchise the Negro,--here the same which
were before the Court in Giles vs. Harris. The highly technical
grounds on which the Court bases its conclusion that there is no
error before it which it is competent to review, notwithstanding the
acknowledged gravity of complainant's charges, suggests the difficulty encountered by Negro citizens in their long struggle for the
right intended to be guaranteed them by the 15th Amendment.
Justice McKenna concurred in the result, and Justice Harlan
1

dissented without opinion.

27

Difficulties in securing redress through the, courts in other
fields are illustrated in Clyatt vs. U. S.12 ' Clyatt had been convicted in a Federal Court in Florida under Sections 1990 and 5526,
of the United States Revised Statutes, abolishing peonage and making it a criminal offense to "hold, arrest, return, or cause to be
held, arrested, or returned . . .to a condition of peonage." The

state of peonage was defined as covered by the prohibition of "involuntary servitude" in the 13th Amendment, and .the statutory
provisions involved were held to be constitutional and valid. The
indictment charged "returning" certain persons to a condition of
peonage, but there was no evidence that they had ever before been
in such a condition. The Court, by Justice Brewer, said: "The
124(1904) 192 U. S. 226, 24 S. Ct. 257, 48 L. Ed. 417.
2
1 5See p. 256, supra.
126(1904) 193 U. S. 146,25 S.Ct. 359,48 L. Ed. 655.

27
jones v. Montague, (1904) 194 U. S.147, 24 S. Ct. 611, 48 L. Ed. 913,
involving wholesale disfranchisement of Negroes in Virginia, was dismissed
because, on account of changed circumstances since the inception of. the case,
there was no subject-matter on which the judgment of the court could
operate. So also in the companion case of Seldon v. Montagu. Following
Mills v. Green, (1895) 159 U. S. 651, 16 S.Ct. 132, 40 L. Ed. 293.
28(1905) 197 U. S. 207, 25 S.Ct. 429,49 L. Ed. 1905.
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testimony discloses that the defendant, with another party, went
to Florida and caused the arrest of Gordon and Ridley (Negroes)
on warrants issued by a magistrate in Georgia for larceny; but
there can be little doubt that these criminal proceedings were only
an excuse for securing the custody of Gordon and Ridley and
taking them back to Georgia to work out a debt. At any rate,
there was abundant testimony from which the jury could have
found that to have been the fact. While this is true, there is not a
scintilla of testimony to show that Gordon and Ridley were ever
theretofore in a condition of peonage, ' 1' 2 9 and hence they could not
be "returned" to that condition. It was therefore held that the
lower court erred in not directing a verdict for defendant, although
no motion to that effect had been made at the trial. justice Harlan,
in a dissenting opinion, declares that "it is going very far to hold
in a case like this, disclosing barbarities of the worst kind against
these Negroes that the trial court erred in sending the case to the
30
jury.'
The 13th Amendment was again before the Court in Hodges
vs. U. S.1"1 The plaintiffs in error were indicted and convicted in
the U. S. District Court, Eastern District of Arkansas, under R. S.,
Sections 1977 and 5508. Section 1977 provided that "All persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every state and territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is
enjoyed by white persons . . . " and Section 5508, construed with
Section 5510, punished conspiracies "to prevent or hinder" "by reason of his color or race," any citizen in the "free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege ... secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States," etc. The acts complained
of amounted to an attempt to compel a group of Negroes to desist
from the 'performance of certain contracts of employment. It was
held (Justice, Brewer presenting the opinion) that the sections as
thus applied were not within the authority of Congress under the
13th Amendment; but that the remedy must be sought in the state
tribunals, subject to the supervision of the Supreme Court of the
United States by writ of error in proper cases. It was conceded by
the counsel for the government that unless the injury in question
was inflicted, as charged in the indictment, solely by reason of the
129At p. 222 of 197 U. S.

130A South Carolina statute somewhat similar to that of Florida was
indirectly questioned in Franklin v. South Carolina, (1910) 218 U. S. 161,
30 S. Ct. 640, 54 L. Ed. 980, but this phase of the case was decided on a
procedural point. An Alabama statute was considered in Bailey v. Alabama,
(1911) 219 U. S. 219, 31 S.Ct. 145, 55 L. Ed. 191, discussed at p. 263, infra.
131(1906) 203 U. S.1,27 S.Ct. 6, 51 L. Ed. 65.
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fact that the subjects -were Negroes, the indictment was invalid.
The Court held, however, that this fact, admitted by the demurrer,
did not save the case. Although inability to make contracts was an
incident of slavery, interference with the right of a freeman in
that case qould not be differentiated from the interference involved
in any other personal wrong, and was not such a "badge of servitude" as had been recognized in previous decisions. Justice Brown
concurred in the result. Justice Harlan dissented, writing an elaborate opinion, in which Justice Day concurred.
The Court passed over the claim that the case was within the
14th Amendment and covered by R.S. Sections 5508 and 5510 with
only a very brief comment: "That the 14th and 15th Amendments
do not justify the legislation is also beyond dispute, for they, as
repeatedly held, are restrictions upon state action, and no action
on the part of the state is complained of. Unless, therefore, the
13th Amendment vests in the nation the jurisdiction claimed, the
remedy must be sought through state action and in state tribunals
subject to the supervision of this court by writ of error in proper
cases."' 132 The dissenting Justices maintained that the construction
given by the majority to the 13th Amendment was too narrow;
that the right in question in the case, the right not to be prevented,
by reason of race or color, from continuing in a lawful employment, was one which inhered in the state of freedom declared by
the 13th Amendment, with the power in Congress to enforce it in
accordance with the terms of Sections 5508 and 5510. Allgeyer vs.
LouisiaZa,'33 although state action was there involved, was cited to
show what this freedom included. That case was one of many where
the 14th Amendment has served the interests of white people, and
the unanimous Court said (by Peckham, J.) that "The liberty mentioned in that Amendment means not only the right of the citizen
to be free from the more physical restraints of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use
them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful
conclusion the purposes above mentioned." On the authority of the
Hodges case, U. S. vs. Powell 34 was decided per curiar in 1909.
Justice Moody did not sit.
'132At p. 14 of 203 U. S. 1.
233(1897) 165 U. S. 578, 17 S. Ct. 427,41 L. Ed. 832.
134(1909) 212 U. S. 564, 29 S. Ct. 690, 53 L. Ed. 653.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

Mob lynching of Negroes, long prevalent in certain Southern
states, came before the Court in U. S. vs. Shipp.'" On February
11, 1906, one Johnson, a Negro, was convicted in a Tennessee
court of rape upon a white woman and was sentenced to death. He
petitioned the U. S. Circuit Court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging illegality in the selection of grand and petit juries, intimidation of counsel and other facts whereby he had been deprived of
his constitutional rights. The petition was denied with a stay for
appeal. During the stay, on March 19th, the Shpreme Court allowed the appeal and ordered the defendant held in custody by the
local sheriff. That night a mob broke into the jail, took Johnson out
and hanged him. There is no suggestion that any prosecution for
this murder was had or contemplated in the state courts, but Shipp
(the local sheriff), and others, who were alleged to have participated directly or indirectly, were brought by information before
the United States Supreme Court on a charge of contempt of
court. The opinion by Justice Holmes cut clearly through the technical objections that were raised, and ordered the trial for contempt
to proceed. It did proceed-very slowly. The matter came on for
hearing on the merits in March 1909, and was decided the following May, Shipp and certain of his associates being found guilty
of contempt as charged. The opinion by the Chief Justice contained
a minute analysis of the evidence. Justices Peckham, White and
McKenna dissented, their views of the evidence bringing them to
an opposite conclusion. No question of law was involved. On November 15 Shipp was sentenced to 90 days imprisonment in the
District of Columbia jail. Some of the co-defendants received a
like sentence, some 60 days. If the Department of Justice and the
Court had then held the views recently announced in the Screws
Case,136 a somewhat more adequate punishment might have been
imposed,--at least on Sheriff Shipp.
It may not be amiss to bring into this survey the bit of "atmosphere" furnished by Battle vs U. S.13 7 The following appears in
the otpinion of Justice Holmes, concerning an incident at the trial
in the Federal Court in Georgia: "An exception was taken to an
interruption of the judge, asking the defendant's counsel to make
an argument that did not tend to degrade the administration of
justice. The reference was an appeal to race prejudice and to
'135(1906) 203 U. S. 563, 27 S. Ct. 165, 51 L. Ed. 319. Lynching was also
involved in Riggins v. U. S., (1905) 199 U. S. 547, 26 S. Ct. 147, 50 L. Ed.
303, but only a procedural point was decided.
136See p. 294, infra.

137(1908) 209 U. S. 36, 28 S. Ct. 422, 52 L. Ed. 670.

THE NEGRO IN THE SUPREME COURT

such language as this: "You will believe a white man not on his
oath before you will a negro who is sworn. You can swallow those
niggers if you want to, but John Randolph Cooper will never
swallow them.' The interruption was fully justified." 13
The Negro race sustained a serious setback in November, 1908,
when the Court announced its decision in Berea College vs. Kentucky.139 A Kentucky statute made it unlawful, with heavy penalties,
"for any person, corporation or association of persons to maintain
or operate any college, school, or institution where persons of the
white and negro races are both received as pupils for instruction."
Berea College, a private corporation, was indicted, convicted and
fined $1,000 under this statute, and the judgment was affirmed by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals. The constitutionality of the
whole statute was attacked in the state court and upheld. On writ
of error the Supreme Court, by Justice Brewer, expressly declining
to consider the constitutional question in its application to individuals, and failing to do so in its application to corporations
generally, sustained the conviction 6n the ground that the highest
court of the state had considered the act separable, and while sustaining it as constitutional, had given independent reasons, which
could not be attacked on constitutional grounds, for applying it
to corporations and particularly the corporation defendant. Justices
Holmes and Moody concurred in the result. Justices Day and
Harlan dissented-the former without a written opinion. 14 ° One
cannot read Justice Harlan's argument without realizing how appropriate it would have been for the Court to meet the larger
question presented by the appeal.
In December, 1908, Bailey vs. Alabant&41 -was before the Court
on a writ of error to reverse a judgment of the Supreme Court of
Alabama affirming a lower court which denied a discharge of
plaintiff in error on habeas corpus. He was held for trial under
a statute claimed to be repugnant to the 13th and 14th Amendments.
'38At p. 39 of 209 U. S. 36.

139 (1908) 211 U. S. 45, 29 S. Ct. 33, 53 L. Ed. 81.
14
0In Buchanan v. Warley, (1917) 245 U. S. 60, 38 S. Ct. 16, 62 L. Ed.
149. discussed at p. 269, inIra, the Court, by justice Day, says of the Berea
College case that the state court was affirmed "solely" upon the reserved
power of the legislature of Kentucky to alter, amend, or repeal charters of
its own corporations. This is certainly not clear on the fact of the decision,
and Justice Harlan seems not to have taken that view in his dissenting opinion. Four members of the Court, when the later case was decided, of whom
Justice Day was one, had sat in the earlier case. See citation of the Berea
College case in Pierce v. Society of Sisters of Holy Names, (1925) 268 U. S.
510, 535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070.

141(1908) 211 U. S.452, 29 S.Ct. 141, 53 L. Ed. 278.
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The Alabama Court was sustained on a procedural ground. Justices
Harlan and Day dissented, holding that the constitutional question
should be considered. The case came back in 1911 and is presented
later in this review.
Thomas vs. Texas' 4 2 was another case where a motion to quash
the indictment on the ground of discrimination in selection of
grand jurors was denied in the trial court,-this time after receiving evidence. The Court held that this determination of the
question of fact, affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
was conclusive, in the absence of such abuse of discretion as
amounted to an infraction of the Federal Constitution (i. e., due
process) "which cannot be presumed and which there is no reason
to hold on the record before

us.

''4

1 3

44

In Marbles vs. Creecy,1 an extradition case, the unanimous
Court, by Justice Harlan, held that: "The executive of the surrendering state need not be controlled in the discharge of his duty
by considerations of race or color, or, in the absence of proof, by
suggestions that the accused will not be fairly dealt with by the
demanding state," and that "On habeas corpus the Court can
assume that a requisition by an executive of a State is solely for
the purpose of enforcing its laws, and that the person surrendered
will be legally tried and adequately protected from mob violence."
4 5
"Jim Crow" took a step forward in Chiles vs. C. & 0. Ry. Co.1
The plaintiff in error, a Negro, had a first-class ticket from Washington, D. C., to Lexington, Kentucky. He changed cars at Ashland, Kentucky, and there went into a car reserved for white passengers exclusively. Pursuant to a regulation of the railway company he was required to remove into a compartment in another
car set apart for colored passengers. This he did under protest, only
when a policeman had been summoned to eject him. He sued for
damages, basing his claims on his rights as an interstate passenger. On the authority of Hall vs. DeCwir and Louisuille, N. 0.
& T. R. C. vs. Mississippi,14 it was held, Justice McKenna writing
the.opinion, that in the absence of Congressional legislation the carrier
could make reasonable regulations for the conduct of its business.
As to what was "reasonable" it was said that this "cannot depend
upon a passenger being state or interstate." The standard adopted
142(1909) 212 U. S. 278, 29 S. Ct. 393,.53 L. Ed. 512.

143See also Franklin v. South Carolina, (1910) 218 U. S. 161, 30 S. Ct.
640, 54 L. Ed. 980.
144(1909) 215 U. S. 63, 30 S. Ct. 32, 54 L. Ed. 92. The quotations are
from Headnotes 3 and 4 of the official syllabus.
145(1910) 218 U. S. 71, 30 S.Ct. 667, 54 L. Ed. 936.
'"6See pp. 235 and 243, supra.
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in Plessy vs. Ferguson was adopted for regulations by the carrier
as well as state legislation, and it was added: "Regulations which
are induced by the general sentiment of the community for whom
they are made and upon whom they operate cannot be said to be
unreasonable. See also Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. vs. Kentucky."
Reference to that decision discloses that it in no way involves the
question of reasonableness, which appears to be vital in the instant
case.

47

The Court's opinion concludes as follows: "The extent of the
difference based upon the distinction between the white and colored
races which may be observed in legislation or in the regulation of
carriers has been discussed so much that we are relieved from
further enlargement upon it. We may refer to Mr. Justice Clifford's
concurring opinion in Hall vs. De Cuir for a review of the cases.
They are also cited in Plessy vs. Ferguson at page 550." The concurring opinion in Hall vs. De Cuir enlarges at length on the argument of the Chief Justice, with some citations directly supporting
segregation on the basis of race, which, however, are all from
state courts. All the cases involving this point which are cited in
Plessy vs. Fergusonhave been included in this review. The decision
thus avoided the embarrassing question of segregation in interstate commerce by state law; and the matter was left in control
of carriers so long as Congress should fail to legislate on the
subject. 4 ' Justice Harlan dissented without opinion.
V
CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE

The second

appearance of Bailey vs. Alabama,L49 brought

squarely before the Court the question of the so-called "peonage"
laws of certain Southern states in the more extreme form exist14"See p. 257, supra.

14sIt seems to have been discovered later than Congress had legislated
on the subject; see Mitchell Case, p. 286, infra. In Chiles, however,
no point seems to have been made of inequality of accommodations. The Kentucky court considered them "substantially equal." How nearly equal they
were can be judged by comparing the following description with those of the
ordinary first-class railway coach: "A passenger coach divided by board
partitions into three compartments; one of these compartments located in
the end of the car, is set apart for colored passengers; the middle compartment is for the use of colored passengers who smoke; and the end compartment is for the accommodation of white people who smoke." It was,
however, "clean and ample for his accommodation, and equipped with the
same conveniences as the other passenger coach on the train from which he
was ejected."
149(1911) 219 U. S.219, 31 S. Ct. 145, 55 L. Ed. 191.
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ing in Alabama. As we have just seen, the Court had declined to
consider this question in 1908. Section 4730 of the Alabama Code;
as amended in 1903 and 1907, provided that any person who, with
intent to injure or defraud his employer, entered into a written
contract for services, and thereby obtained money or other personal
property, and with like intent and without just cause, and without
refunding the money or paying for the property, refused to perform the service, should be punished as if he had stolen it. Amendments made the failure to perform the service contracted for, or
refund the money or pay for the property so received, prima facie
evidence of the criminal intent to defraud. A rule of evidence enforced by the courts of Alabama as though included in the laws
of the state disqualified the accused person from testifying "as to
his uncommunicated motives, purpose or intention." Bailey, the
plaintiff in error, had been convicted under this statute. He was
a Negro, and while the Court took pains to disclaim all consideration of that fact, it was notorious that laws of this sort had as
their objective protection of white employers against alleged delinquencies of black agricultural laborers. The case was considered
one of much importance and was exhaustively argued. It was held,
(Justice Hughes writing the opinion) that by reason of the provision making refusal to perform the labor contracted prima facie
evidence of criminal intent to defraud (especially since the accused
could not testify as to his intention) the Alabama statute offended
against the 13th Amendment,-being in the direction of compulsion
to "involuntary servitude." Lawyers will be interested in the
criticism of this decision by Justice Holmes, dissenting, in which
Justice Lurton concurred. 150
Thirty years after The Civil Rights Cases,15 the question of
the validity of the Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875, in cases
arising where the United States had undoubted and plenary jurisdiction, expressly reserved in the earlier decision, came before the
1 52
Court in Butts vs. Merchants and Miners Transportation Co.
'5oCresswell v. Grande Lodge, Knights of Pythias, (1912) 225 U. S. 246,
32 S. Ct. 822, 56 L. Ed. 1074, was a suit by a white fraternal order against a
Negro order to enjoin the use of certain names and symbols. The nature of
the controversy does not bring the case within the scope of this study. This
is ,also true of Ancient, etc. Order of the Mystic Shrine v. Michaux, (1929)
279 U. S. 737, 49 S. Ct. 485, 73 L. Ed. 939. Jones v. Jones, (1914) 234 U. S.
615, 34 S. Ct. 937, 58 L. Ed. 1520, has not been overlooked, and is omitted
from the text for a like reason. It involved a Tennessee statute of descent
which, as construed by the Tennessee courts, was held not in conflict with
the 14th Amendment.
'i5See p. 241, supra.

-152(1913)230 U. S. 126, 33 S. Ct. 964, 57 L. Ed. 1422.
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A Negro woman, holding a first-class ticket on a coastwise vessel
from Boston to Norfolk and return, sued under Sections 1 and 2
of the Act for damages, alleging deprivation, on account of color,
of the privileges accorded to other first-class passengers who were
white. The unanimous court (Justice Van Dervanter writing the
opinion and Justice Harlan being no longer there) recognized
The Civil Rights Cases as authoritatively declaring the applicable
law, on the ground that the terms of the Act in question, it being
a criminal statute, were not separable. U. S. vs. Reese, was cited
as in point.'
"Peonage" in Alabama came up again in 1914.154 Justice Day
delivered the opinion of the Court, Justice Holmes concurring
with evident reluctance. Justice McReynolds took no part. The
provisions of the statute in question appear sufficiently in the
official syllabus: "A condition of peonage forbidden by the U. S.
Constitution, 13th Amendment, and U. S. Comp. Stats., 1901, pp.
1366, 3175, results from the operation of the provisions of the
Alabama Code, Sec. 6846, under which a person fined upon conviction for a misdemeanor may confess judgment with a surety in
the amount of the fine and costs, and may agree with the surety
in consideration of the latter's payment of the confessed judgment,
to reimburse him by working for him upon terms, approved by
the court, which may in fact be more onerous than if the convict
had been sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor, the performance
of his agreed service being enforced by the constant fear of rearrest, a new prosecution, and a new fine for his breach of contract, which new penalty he may undertake to liquidate by a
similar contract, attended by similar circumstances and penalties."
The facts involved throw such light on social and industrial conditions a generation ago, in certain portions of the United States,
as to warrant recital in some detail.
153 See p. 230, supra. In accepting as conclusive the declaration of the
earlier case that the Act showed on its face that it was not based upon constitutional right of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, and that the
case should therefore be decided under the 14th Amendment, the Court cited
the preamble: "Whereas it is essential to just government that we recognize
the equality of all men before the law, and hold that it is the duty of government in its dealings with the people to mete out equal and exact justice to all,
of whatever nativity, race, color or persuasion, religious or political; and it
being the appropriate object of legislation to enact great principles into law:
Therefore-Be it enacted, etc."
154U. S. v. Reynolds, (1914) 235 U. S. 133, 35 S. Ct. 86, 59 L. Ed. 163
and the companion case of U. S. v. Broughton. In neither case does it expressly appear in the report in the Supreme Court or in the court below that
the person alleged to be held in peonage was a negro. It seems probable that
such was the fact, in view of the well-known purpose for which such laws
in some of the southern states were devised and employed.
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In the Reynolds Case one Rivers, on conviction of petit larceny,
w'as fined $15 and costs, $43.75. Reynolds appeared as his surety
and judgment by confession was entered against him for the fine
and costs. This Reynolds paid. Rivers thereupon entered into a
written contract with Reynolds to work for him as a farm-hand
for nine months and twenty-four days at $6 per month, in payment
of the fine and costs. He entered into Reynolds' employment, and
under threats of arrest and imprisonment if he should quit, worked
from May 4 to June 6, when he refused to go on. Thereupon he
was arrested at the instance of Reynolds for violation of the contract for service. He was again convicted, fined one cent for the
violation of the contract and additional costs in the sum of $87.05,
for which he again confessed judgment and entered into a similar
contract with another surety to work at the same rate for fourteen
months and fifteen days. The facts in the Broughtan case were similar. The original offense was selling mortgaged property. The fine
was $50 and $67.50 costs; the first agreed term of service nineteen
months and twenty-nine days; the actual term of service from July 8
to September 14, with a new arrest at Broughton's instance upon
quitting. And on this howing a U. S. District Judge .of the
Southern District of Alabama had held that the conduct of
Reynolds and Broughton was justified by the Alabama statute
and was not an offense against Federal law. The judgment below
was reversed.
In McCabe vs. A. T. & S. F. R. Co.155 a majority of the Court,
speaking by Justice Hughes, declared that since Plessy vs. Ferguson,156 "The, question could no longer be considered an open one,
that it was not an infraction of the 14th Amendment for a state to
require separate, but equal, accommodations for the two races;"
but that for a state law to permit common carriers to provide
sleeping, dining and chair cars for whites, without similar accommodations for Negroes, was such an infraction. Under the circumstances of the case, however, injunctive relief was denied, and the
four Justices (White, C. J., Holmes, Lamar and McReynolds)
who did not join in the opinion concurred in the result.
An ingenious - however transparent - trick resorted to for
circumventing the 15th Amendment, was the "grandfather clause."
This came into the Supreme Court in Guinn vs. U. S.157 and Myers
vs. Anderson,'." from Oklahoma and Maryland, decided June 21,
155(1914)
235 U. S. 151, 35 S. Ct. 69, 59 L. Ed. 169.
6
See p. 246, supra.
157(1915) 238 U. S. 347, 35 S. Ct. 926, 59 L. Ed. 1340.
158(1915) 238 U. S. 368, 35 S. Ct. 932, 59 L. Ed. 1349.
1-
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1915. An amendment to the Oklahoma constitution exempted from
a literacy test for voters every person "who was, on January 1st,
1866, or at any time prior thereto, entitled to vote under any form
of government," or was a "lineal descendant of such person." In
the Myers case it appeared that a Maryland statute fixing the
qualifications of voters at municipal elections in the city of Annapolis described one of the enumerated group as -follows: "All
citizens who prior to January 1, 1868, were entitled to vote in this
state or any state of the United States at a state election, and the
lawful male descendants of any person who prior to January 1, 1868,
was" similarly entitled to vote. In each case the Court (by Chief
Justice White) brushed aside the device as contrary to the 15th
Amendment. There was no dissent. Justice McReynolds took no
part in the cases.
The important question of statutory housing restrictions against
Negroes did not get to Washington until early in 1916, and was
not decided until November, 1917. It was then answered in the
negative by the unanimous court in Bichanan vs. Warley,'159 which
was an action for the specific performance of a contract for the
sale of land to a Negro for residence purposes, in Louisville,
Kentucky. The contract provided that the purchaser should not
be required to accept a deed unless he had the legal right to occupy
the property as a residence. The city prohibited this by a discriminatory ordinance. The ordinance was held invalid in a unanimous
decision, of which the 3rd headnote is as follows: "A colored
person has the right to acquire property without state legislation
discriminating against him solely on account of color, under U. S.
Constitution, 14th Amendment, providing that no state shall deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of
law, nor deny to any person the equal protection of the laws, and
the Act of Congress of April 9, 1866 (... Comp. Stat. 1916, Sec.

3931), providing that all 'citizens of the United States' shall have
the same right in every state and territory as is enjoyed by the
white citizen thereof to 'purchase' real and personal property."
Said the Court, by Justice Day: "That there exists a serious and
difficult problem arising from a feeling of race hostility which the
law is powerless to control, and to which it must give a measure of
consideration, may be freely admitted, but its solution cannot be
promoted by depriving citizens of their onstitutional rights and
privileges ... It is the purpose of such enactments (as the Louis-

ville ordinance), and it is frankly avowed it will be their ultimate
19(1917) 245 U. S. 60, 38 S. Ct. 16, 62 L. Ed. 149.
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effect, to require by law, at least in residential districts, the compulsory separation of the races on account of color. Such action is
said to .be essential to the maintenance of the purity of the races.
•..The case presented does not deal with an attempt to prohibit
the amalgamation of the races. The right which the ordinance annulled was the civil right of a white man to dispose of his property
if he saw fit to do so to a person of color, and of a colored person
to make such disposition to a white person. It is urged that this
proposed segregation will promote the public peace by preventing
race conflicts. Desirable as this is... this aim cannot be accomplished
by law or ordinances which deny rights created or protected by
the Federal Constitution. It is said that such acquisitions by colored
persons depreciate property owned in the neighborhood by white
persons. But property may be acquired by undesirable white
neighbors, or put to disagreeable though lawful uses with like
results."160
VI
TAFT, C.

J.

"The corrective process" afforded by state courts, found sufficient in Frank vs. Mangun. 6

.

(not a Negro case but an extreme

instance of mob domination, in which justice Holmes wrote one
of his famous dissents, justice Hughes concurring) was found
insufficient in Moore vs. Dempsey.16' The case came up from Arkansas on appeal from an order of a U. S. District judge, dismissing
upon demurrer a petition for habeas corpus in behalf of a group of
Negroes under sentence of death in the state courts. The report
of the case is as interesting as a good story in a "thriller" magazine,
but we will give space only to a paragraph in the syllabus which
states the facts in a summary style not often found in the reports
of this tribunal: "A trial for murder in a state court in which the
accused are hurried to conviction under mob domination without
regard to their rights is without due process of law and absolutely
void." This assumes, of course, the correctness of the recital of
facts in the petition; and it was ordered, justice Holmes writing
16OAt pp. 80-83 of 245 U. S. Cf. Hansberry v. Lee, (1940) 311 U. S. 32,
61 S. Ct. 115, 85 L. Ed. 22. There was challenged herein an agreement of
owners of residence property in Chicago not to sell lots to, or permit them to
be occupied by, negroes, without the consent of owners of 95 per cerit
of the
lot frontage in the area. The suit was successful, but the grounds of decision
(opinion by Justice Stone) were such that the case establishes no point appropriate to be considered in this review.
161(1915) 237 U. S.309. 35 S.Ct. 582, 59 L. Ed. 969.
162(1923) 261 U. S.86, 43 S.Ct. 265, 67 L. Ed. 543.
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the opinion, that the petition shuld-be heard in the District Court,the position he and Justice Hughes had taken in the Frank case
without avail. Justices McReyfi61ds and Sutherlfnd presented a
vigorous dissent, based on the Viekv that on the whole record the
petition ought not, even upon deniurrer, to have sufficient credit
to warrant a hearing.
In Corriganvs. Buckley,'16 3 the Coirt held unanimously (opinion
by Sanford, J.) that an agreement ashong white holders of real
estate in the District of Columbia not to convey their property to
Negroes was so plainly not obnoxious to any constitutional provision that no substantial constitutional question was involved in
the appeal. Therefore, not having jurisdiction under the Judicial
Code, the Court could not determine the points relied on by defendants that the restrictive agreement was void as against public
policy, and of such a discriminatory character that a court of equity
ought not to lend its aid to enforce specific performance.13a
It is a noteworthy-perhaps significant-fact that the direct
issue of a state's right to require separation of the white and Negro
races in the public schools has never been squarely decided by the
6
Supreme Court, although language used in Plessy vs. Ferguson,'
5
pointed strongly to an affirmative answer. Gong Lum vs. Rice""
skirted more closely along the edge of this issue than any case
previously considered by the Court. A native child of pure Chinese
blood was excluded from a white public school under a provision
of the Mississippi Constitution providing that "Separate schools
shall be maintained for children of the white and colored races."
The exclusion was upheld in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft, from
which there was no dissent. The decision was in effect that a child
of Chinese blood, born in and a citizen of the United States, was
not denied the equal protection of the laws by being classed by the
state among the colored races who are assigned to public schools
separate from those provided for the whites, when equal facilities
for education are afforded to both classes. As the case was presented
163 (1926) 271 U. S. 323, 46 S. Ct. 521, 70 L. Ed. 969.
'o3aA similar question arose in 1945. In Mays vs. Burgess, 147 Fed. 2nd,
869, the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, held in a 2 to 1
decision that a deed made in violation of such an agreement was invalid,
Certiorari was denied, 325 U. S. 868. Justices Murphy and Rutledge were
of a contrary opinion, and Justices Reed and Jackson took no part. It has

been suggested that perhaps one reason why the writ was withheld was that

the restrictive covenant, made September 1, 1921, for 21 years, had only fifteen
months to run and conditions were such that by the time it expired the controversy
would probably settle itself.
0
' 34See p. 246, supra.
1,5(1927) 275 U. S. 78, 48 S. Ct. 91, 72 L. Ed. 172.
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by the petitioner the constitutionality of separation of whites from
Negroes was not attacked, the question being merely whether a
Chinese child should be classed as "colored." In view of the importance of the basic question the summary character of the opinion
seems unfortunate. Beyond a recital of facts and certain provisions
of the constitution and statutes of Mississippi it is as follows: "The
case then reduces itself to the question whether a state can be said
to afford to a child of Chinese ancestry, born in this country, and
a citizen of the United States, the equal protection of the laws by
giving her the opportunity for a common school education in a
school which receives only colored children of the brown, yellow
or black races. The right and power of the state to regulate the
method of providing for the education of its youth at public expense
i clear. In Cumming vs. Richmond County Board of Education,
175 U. S. 528, persons of color sued the board of education to enjoin
it from maintaining a high school for white children without providing a similar school for colored children which had existed andhad been discontinued." Here follows a quotation from Justice
Harlan's opinion. It is not noted, however, that in declaring the
principle of the state's control of education, that opinion expressly
reserves a case of "clear and unmistakable disregard of the rights
secured by the supreme law of the land,"-i. e., the Fourteenth
Amendment. And Justice Harlan took pains to add that under the
facts before the Court "we have no such case to be determined."
"The question here," continues the opinion in the Gong Lunt case,
"is whether a Chinese citizen of the United States is denied equal
protection of the laws when he is classed among the colored races
and furnished facilities for education equal to that offered to all,
whether white, brown, yellow or black. Were this a new question,
it would call for very full argument and consideration, but we
think it is the same question which has been many times decided to
be within the constitutional power of the state legislature to settle
without intervention of the federal courts under the Federal Constitution."' 166 The opinion then quotes language used in Plessy vs.
Ferguson,67 in regard to separation of the races in the public schools
(a question not before the Court in that case) and concludes: "Most
of the cases cited arose, it is true, over the establishment of separate
' 66 The Court here cites many cases from state courts and the following
from the lower federal courts: Bertonneau v. School Directors, (Cir. Ct.,
La. Dist. 1878) 3 Woods 177; U. S. v. Buntin, (Cir. Ct., S. D. Ohio, W. D.
1882) 10 Fed. 730; Wong Him v. Callahan, (Cir. Ct., N. D. Cal. 1902)
119 Fed. 381. There is no case cited from the Supreme Court.
l-See p. 246, supra.
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schools as between white and black pupils, but we cannot think
that the question is any different or that any different result can
be reached, assuming the cases above cited to be rightly decided,
where the issue is as between white pupils and the pupils of the
yellow races. The decision is within the discretion of the state in
regulating its public schools and does not conflict with the 14th
Amendment."
Another device to defeat negro suffrage which was new in the
Supreme Court appeared in Nixon vs. Herndon.6 8 A negro attempted to vote at a Democratic primary held in Texas for nomination of candidates for Senator and Representative in Congress.
His ballot was refused under a Texas statute which declared that
"in no event shall a Negro be eligible to participate in a Democratic
primary election held in the State of Texas." Justice Holmes,
speaking for a unanimous Court, said: "It seems to us hard to
imagine a more direct and obvious infringement of the 14th
Amendment," citing with approval some of the broad language of
Strouder vs. West Virginia.69 The judgment below was reversed,
but Nixon was not yet to get his vote.
VII
CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES

The first case, pertinent to this inquiry, that arose after the
accession of Chief Justice Hughes was Aldridge vs. U.

S170

The

case came up on certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia. It was held to be reversible error for the trial court
to refuse to permit interrogatories as to racial prejudice on the voir
dire of jurors, in a case in -which a Negro was on trial for the
murder of a white man. Chief Justice Hughes spoke for the Court,
and Justice McReynolds dissented.
The Texas legislature promptly repealed the offending section
involved in Nixon vs. Herndon, and substituted another which
provided that: "Every political party in the state through its State
Executive Committee shall have the power to prescribe the qualifications of its own members and shall in its own way determine who
shall be qualified to vote or otherwise participate in such political
party." Acting under this statute the Democratic State Executive
Committee adopted a resolution "that all white Democrats who
are qualified under the constitution and laws of Texas and who
168(1927) 273 U. S. 536, 47 S. Ct. 446, 71 L. Ed. 759.

11 gSee p. 237, supra.
270(1931) 283 U. S. 308, 51 S. Ct. 470, 75 L. Ed. 1054.
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subscribe to the statutory pledge provided in Article 3110, Revised
Civil Statutes of Texas, and none other, be allowed to participate"
in certain forthcoming primaries. Again Nixon, who was a
qualified voter unless disqualified by the foregoing resolution, went
to the polls and requested a ballot. This was refused by the judges
of election, on the ground that he was a Negro and by force of'the
resolution only white Democrats could vote at the primary. His
1
17
action for damages was dismissed in the U. S. District Court,
7 2
and this was affirmed in the Circuit Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit.

In the Supreme Court justice Cardozo, speaking for the majority,
cut through the argument that the party committee did not represent the state in the following terms: "Whether in given circumstances parties or their committees are agencies of government
within the 14th 'and 15th Amendments is a question which this
Court will determine for itself. It is not concluded upon such inquiry
by decisions rendered elsewhere. The test is not whether the members of the Executive Committee are the representatives of the state
in the strict sense in which an agent is the representative of his
principal. The test is whether they are to be classified as representatives of the state to such an extent and in such a sense that the
great restraints of the Constitution set limits to their action. Delegates of the state's power have discharged their official functions
in such a way as to discriminate invidiously between white citizens
and black... The 14th Amendment, adopted as it was with special
solicitude for the equal protection of members of the Negro race,
lays a duty upon the Court to level by its judgment these barriers
of color.'1 7 3 There was the "five-to-four" division of the Court

which later became quite familiar. The decision was supported by
Hughes, C. J., and by Brandeis, Stone and Roberts, JJ. Justice
McReynolds presented a strong dissenting opinion, in which Justices
74

Van Devanter, Sutherland and Butler joinedY.
171(1929) 34 F. (2d) 464.
172(1931) 49 F. (2d) 1012.
' 73Nixon v. Condon, (1932) 286 U. S. 73, 52 S. Ct. 484, 76 L. Ed. 984.
174Itseems desirable to take note of the personnel of the Court more carefully than we have done heretofore. When Nixon v. Condon was decided its
membership was as follows:
Chief Justice Hughes, appointed from New York by President Hoover.
Justice Van Devanter, appointed from Wyoming by President Taft.
Justice McReynolds, appointed from Tennessee by President Wilson.
Justice Brandeis, appointed from Massachusetts by President Wilson.
Justice Sutherland, appointed from Utah by President Harding.
Justice Butler, appointed from Minnesota by President Harding.
Justice Stone, appointed from New York by President Coolidge.
Justice Roberts, appointed from Pennsylvania by President Hoover.
Justice Cardozo, appointed from New York by President Hoover.
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Powell vs. Alabanma, 17 much publicized as "the Scottsboro
Case," was heard in 1932. The Court's opinion, by Justice Sutherland, contained a long and careful discussion of due piocess with
reference to the timely appointment of counsel in a capital case,
and reached the conclusion that under all the facts "the failure of
the trial court to give them (the defendants below) reasonable time
and opportunity to secure counsel was a clear denial of due process."
All defendants were Negroes, indicted, tried and convicted for
the rape of white women. The case is noteworthy as showing the
length to which the Court as then constituted was willing to go in
order to insure justice to a group of friendless blacks under sentence
of death for an atrocious crime. Justices Butler and McReynolds
thought the majority went too far in their interpretation of the
evidence.
One of the men involved in the preceding case was again in
the Supreme Court after retrial, conviction and sentence to death
in Norris vs. Alabama.17 In the trial court there were motions to
quash the indictment and the trial venire on the ground of the
exclusion of Negroes from the grand and petit jury lists solely
because of race and color. The Court, by Hughes, C. J., Justice
McReynolds taking no part, went even further than in Neal vs.
Delaware 7 7 in inquiring into all the relevant facts in determining
the issue. The opinion declared that "When a federal right has
been specially set up and claimed in a state court, it is our province
to inquire not merely whether it was denied in express terms, but
also whether it was denied in substance and effect. If this requires
an examination of evidence, that examination must be made. Otherwise, review by this Court would fail of its purpose in safeguarding
constitutional rights.' 17 Thus examining the evidence the Court
said: "We are of the opinion that the evidence required a different
result from that reached in the state court. We think that the
evidence that for a generation or longer no Negro had been called
for service on any jury in Jackson County, that there were Negroes
qualified for jury service, that according to the practice of the
jury commission their names would normally appear on the preliminary list of male citizens of the requisite age but that no names
of Negroes were placed on the jury roll, and the testimony with
respect to the lack of appropriate consideration of the qualifications
175(1932) 287 U. S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158. Two other companion
cases were Patterson v. Alabama and Weems v. Alabama.
176(1935) 294 U. S. 587, 55 S. Ct. 579, 79 L. Ed. 1074.
7
1 7See p. 239, supra.
178At p. 590 of 294 U. S.
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of Negroes, established the discrimination which the Constitution
79
forbids.'
Not deterred by the two Nixon cases the Democrats of Texas
tried again to exclude negroes from the party primaries,--this
time with better luck. On May 24, 1932, the State Democratic
convention adopted the following resolution: "Be it resolved that
all white citizens of the State of Texas who are qualified to vote
under the constitution and laws of the state shall be eligible to
membership in the Democratic party and as such entitled to participate in its deliberations." The case came up for review of the
judgment of the highest court of Texas having jurisdiction, sustaining a demurrer to the complaint. According to the facts admitted
by the demurrer, one Grovey, a negro, was refused an absentee
ballot by the county clerk, a state official, by virtue of the resolution above quoted. Candidates for Senator and Representative
in Congress were to be elected at the forthcoming election, and
nomination by the Democratic party was equivalent to election.
Grovey brought suit for damages. The Court, by Justice Roberts,
held unanimously that the facts complained of did not constitute
state action in violation of the 14th and 15th Amendments. 8 0
Brown vs. Mississippi,8" is worthy of considerable space, as
an example (let us hope extreme) of the kind of "justice" Negroes
received in Mississippi less than a dozen years ago. The unanimous
opinion of the Court, consisting mainly of a recital of the facts,
was delivered by the Chief justice. Two Negroes were indicted
for a murder which occurred March 30, 1934. At the trial confessions of the defendants were presented, which they claimed had
been extorted by violence. "Aside from the confessions, there was
no evidence sufficient to warrant the submission of the case to the
jury." The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the conviction
on two grounds: That immunity from self-incrimination is not
essential to due process of law; and that the failure of the trial
court to exclude the confessions after the introduction of evidence
179At p. 596 of 294 U. S. With the Norris case the Court had before it
and decided the same day that of still another member of the 1932 group. The
same result was reached. In holding, against a claim to the contrary not
made in the Norris case, that it had full jurisdiction, the court took a noticeably liberal attitude. Patterson v. Alabama, (1935) 294 U. S. 600, 55 S. Ct.
575, 79 L. Ed. 656. The Neal and Norris cases were followed in Hollins v.
Oklahoma, (1935) 295 U. S. 394, 55 S. Ct. 784, 79 L. Ed. 1500, a per
curiam
decision.
180 Grovey v. Townsend, (1935) 295 U. S. 45, 55 S. Ct. 622, 79 L. Ed.
45. See, however, Smith v. Allwright, p. 288, infra, where this case is overruled.
181(1936) 297 U. S. 278, 50 S. Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682.
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showing their inadmissibility, in the absence of a request for such
exclusion, did not deprive the defendants of life and liberty without
due process of law. The facts disclosed by the evidence referred to
appear in the recital (quoted in full by Chief Justice Hughes) in
the dissenting opinion of two members of the Mississippi Supreme
Court:
"The crime with which these defendants, all ignorant negroes,
are charged, was discovered about one o'clock p. m. on Friday,
March 30, 1934. On that night one Dial, a deputy sheriff, accompanied by others, came to the home of Ellington, one of the defendants, and requested him to accompany them to the house of
the deceased, and there a number of white men were gathered, who
began to accuse the defendant of the crime. Upon his denial they
seized him, and with the participation of the deputy they hanged
him by a rope to the limb of a tree, and having let him down, they
hung him again, and when he was let down the second time, and
he still protested his innocence, he was tied to a tree and whipped,
and still declining to accede to the demands that he confess, he was
finally released and he returned with some difficulty to his home,
suffering intense pain and agony. The record of the testimony
shows that the signs of the rope on his neck were plainly visible
during the so-called trial. A day or two thereafter the said deputy,
accompanied by another, returned to the home of the said defendant
and arrested him, and departed with the prisoner towards the jail
in an adjoining county, but went by a route which led into the
State of Alabama; and while on the way, in that state, the deputy
stopped and again severely whipped the defendant, declaring that
he would continue the whipping until he confessed, and the defendant then agreed to confess to such a statement as the deputy
would dictate, and he did so, after which he was delivered to jail.
"The other two defendants, Ed Brown and Henry Shields,
were also arrested and taken to the same jail. On Sunday night,
April 1, 1934, the same deputy, accompanied by a number of white
men, one of whom was also an officer, and by the jailor, came to
the jail, and the two last named defendants were made to strip
and they were laid over chairs and their backs were cut to pieces
with a leather strap with buckles on it, and they were likewise
made by the said deputy definitely to understand that the whipping
would be continued unless and until they confessed, and not only
confessed, but confessed in every matter of detail as demanded
by those present; and in this manner the defendants confessed the
crime, and as the whippings progressed and were repeated, they
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changed or adjusted their confession in all particulars of detail so
as to conform to the demands of their torturers. When the confessions had been obtained in the exact form and contents as desired
by the mob, they left with the parting admonition and warning
that, if the defendants changed their story at any time in any
respect from that last stated, the perpetrators of the outrage would
administer the same or equally effective treatment.
"Further details of the brutal treatment to which these helpless
prisoners were subjected need not be pursued. It is sufficient to
say that in pertinent respects the transcript reads more like pages
torn from some medieval account, than a record made within the
confines of a modern civilization which aspires to an enlightened
constitutional government.
"All this having been accomplished, on the next day, that is, on
Monday, April 2, when the defendants had been given time to
recuperate somewhat from the tortures to which they had been
subjected, the two sheriffs, one of the county where the crime was
committed, and the other of the county of the jail in which the
prisoners were confined, came to the jail, accompanied by eight
other persons, some of them deputies, there to hear the free and
voluntary confession of these miserable and abject defendants. The
sheriff of the county of the crime admitted that he had heard of
the whipping, but averred that he had no personal knowledge of it.
He admitted that one of the defendants, when brought before him
to confess, was limping and did not sit down, and that this particular defendant then and there stated that he had been strapped
so severely that he could not sit down, and as already stated, the
signs of the rope on the neck of another of the defendants were
plainly visible to all. Nevertheless the solemn farce of hearing the
free and voluntary confessions was gone through with, and these
two sheriffs and one other person then present were the three
witnesses used in court to establish the so-called confessions, which
-were received by the court and admitted in evidence over the
objections of the defendants duly entered as of record as each of
the said three witnesses delivered their alleged testimony. There
was thus enough before the court when these confessions were
first offered to make known to the court that they were not, beyond all reasonable doubt, free and voluntary; and the failure of
the court then to exclude the confessions is sufficient to reverse the
judgment, under every rule of procedure that has heretofore been
prescribed, and hence it was not necessary subsequently to renew
the objections by motion or otherwise.
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"The spurious confessions having been obtained-and the farce
last mentioned having been gone through with on Monday, April
2d-the court, then in session, on the following day, Tuesday,
April 3, 1934, ordered the grand jury to reassemble on the succeeding day, April 4, 1934, at nine o'clock, and on the morning of
the day last mentioned the grand jury returned an indictment against
the defendants for murder. Late that afternoon the defendants
were brought from the jail in the adjoining county and arraigned,
when one or more of them offered to plead quilty, which the court
declined to accept, and, upon inquiry whether they had or desired
counsel, they stated that they had none, and did not suppose that
counsel could be of any assistance to them. The court thereupon
appointed counsel, and set the case for trial for the following morning at nine o'clock, and the defendants were returned to the jail
in the adjoining county about thirty miles away.
"The defendants were brought to the courthouse of the county
on the following morning, April 5th, and the so-called trial was
opened, and was concluded on the next day, April 6, 1934, and
resulted in a pretended conviction with death sentences. The evidence upon which the conviction was obtained was the so-called
confessions. Without this evidence a peremptory instruction to
find for the defendants would have been inescapable. The defendants were put on the stand, and by their testimony the facts
and the details thereof as to the manner by which the confessions
were extorted from them were fully developed, and it is further
disclosed by the record that the same deputy, Dial, under whose
guiding hand and active participation the tortures to coerce the
confessions were administered, was actively in the performance of
the supposed duties of a court deputy in the courthouse and in the
presence of the prisoners during what is denominated, in complimentary terms, the trial of these defendants. This deputy was put
on the stand by the state in rebuttal, and admitted the whippings.
It is interesting to note that in his testimony with reference to the
whipping of the defendant Ellington, and in response to the inquiry
as to how severely he was whipped, the deputy stated, 'Not too
much for a negro; not as much as I would have done if it were
left to me.' Two others who had participated in these whippings
were introduced and admitted it-not a single witness was introduced who denied it. The facts are not only undisputed, they are
admitted, and admitted to have been done by officers of the state,
in conjunction with other participants, and all this was definitely
well known to everybody connected with the trial, and during the
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trial, including the state's prosecuting attorney and the trial judge
2
presiding."

8
1

The Court held that the use of confessions thus obtained was
a clear denial of due process. The procedural point was swept
aside, and the true attitude of the Mississippi courts exposed, in
the following terms: "The duty of maintaining constitutional rights
of a person on trial for his life rises above mere rules of procedure,
and wherever the Court is clearly satisfied that such violations exist
it will refuse to sanction such violations and will apply the corrective. In the instant case the trial court was fully advised by the
undisputed evidence of the way in which the confessions had been
procured. The trial court knew that there was no other evidence
upon which conviction and sentence could be based. Yet it proceeded to permit conviction and to pronounce sentence. The conviction and sentence were void for want of the essential elements
of due process, and the proceeding thus vitiated could be challenged
in any appropriate manner . . . It was challenged before the Su-

preme Court of the State by the express invocation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court entertained the challenge, considered the
federal question thus presented, but declined to enforce petitioners'
constitutional right. The court thus denied a federal right fully
established and especially set up and claimed." 183
The first attack upon the poll tax in the Supreme Court was
made by a white man in Breedlove vs. Suttles. 18 4 The decision, which
was unanimous and presented by Justice Butler,18 5 disposed of the
claim that the tax was repugnant to the 14th Amendment, as follows: "To make payment of poll taxes a prerequisite of voting
is not to deny any privilege or immunity protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Privilege of voting is not derived from the United
States, but is conferred by the state, and save as restrained by the
Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments and other provisions of
182 See the case below in (1934) 173 Miss. 563, 161 So. 465. The dissenting opinion from which this excerpt is taken will be found at pp. 572 ff.
of 173 Miss. and pp. 470, 471 of 161 So.
1831 am not including in this study Herndon v. Georgia, (1935)
295
U. S. 441, 55 S. Ct. 794, 79 L. Ed. 1550, and Herndon v. Lowry, (1937) 301
U. S. 242, 57 S. Ct. 732, 81 L. Ed. 1066. The merits of the case were not involved in'the former, and the latter covered constitutional rights to freedom
of speech and assembly, without reference to the race or color of the defendant-appellant. He was a negro communist agitator, indicted and convicted
upon a charge of attempting to incite insurrection, especially among negroes
of the Black Belt. Herndon v. Lowry was a "5 to 4" case, Justice Roberts
writing the majority and more liberal opinion.
184(1937) 302 U. S.277, 58 S.Ct. 205, 82 L. Ed. 252.
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Justice Van Devanter had retired and Justice Black from Alabama
had been added to the Court.
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the Federal Constitution, the state may condition suffrage as it
deems appropriate . . . The privileges and immunities protected
are only those that arise from the Constitution and laws of the
United States and not those that spring from other sources."'81 6
Discrimination against Negroes in employment first came to
the attention of the Court in March 1938, in New Negro Alliance
vs. Sanitary Grocery Company.8 7 The matter in controversy was
whether the case made by the pleadings involved or grew out of a
labor dispute within the meaning of Section 13 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act of March 23, 1932. The facts were thus summarized
by the Court: "The petitioners requested the respondent to adopt
a policy of employing Negro clerks in certain of its stores in" the
course of personnel changes; the respondent ignored the request
and the petitioners caused one person to patrol in front of one
of the respondent's stores on one day carrying a placard which
said--'Do Your Part! Buy Where You Can Work! No Negroes
Employed Here!' and caused or threatened a similar patrol of two
other stores of respondent. The information borne by the placard
was true. The patrolling did not coerce or intimidate respondent's
customers; did not physically harass persons desiring to enter the
store; the picket acted in an orderly manner, and his conduct did
not cause crowds to gather in front of the store." The lower courts
had granted an injunction against the picketing. In reversing this
the Court said, by Justice Roberts,---Justices McReynolds and
Butler joining in a brief but caustic dissent :8s "The desire for fair
and equitable conditions of employment on the part of persons of
any race, color or persuasion, and the removal of discriminations
against them by reason of their race or religious beliefs is quite as
important to those concerned as fairness and equity in terms and
conditions of employment can be to trade or craft unions or any
form of labor organization or association. Race discrimination by
an employer may reasonably be deemed more unfair and less excusable than discrimination against workers on the ground of union
affiliation. There is no justification in the apparent purposes or
the express terms of the act for limiting its definition of labor
disputes and cases arising therefrom by excluding those which
arise with respect to discrimination in terms and conditions of
employment based upon differences of race or color."
186At p. 283 of 302 U. S.
187(1938) 303 U. S. 552, 58 S. Ct. 703, 82 L. Ed. 1012. The case came
upon certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia.

1S3Justice Reed from Kentucky had succeeded Justice Sutherland.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

A per curiam decision in April 1938 is worthy of note because
of the facts and the technical and conspicuously unfair attitude of
the Kentucky courts. 8 9 In 1936 a Negro was indicted for murder
in McCracken County. He moved to set aside the indictment on
-the ground that the jury commissioners had excluded from the list
from which the grand jury was drawn all persons of African
descent because of their race and color. Among the facts shown
by supporting affidavits were the following: that the population of
the county was approximately 48,000, of which 8,000 were Negroes;
that the county assessor's books showed approximately 6,000
white persons and 700 Negroes qualified for jury service in accordance with the state laws; that the jury commissioners filled the
wheel for jury service in 1936 with between 500 and 600 names
exclusively of white citizens; that the failure to draw any Negro
was not due to any statutory disqualification. There was an offer
to show "systematic and arbitrary" exclusion of Negroes from
jury service in the county, on account of race and color, for a
period of fifty years. Counsel for the state stipulated that the
witnesses named by defendant would testify as specified, and
offered no evidence to the contrary. Defendant was convicted and
sentenced to death, and the judgment was affirmed in the Kentucky
Court of Appeals. It appeared from an affidavit of the clerk of the
trial court that by inadvertence a copy of the motion to set aside
the indictment was omitted from the record before the Court of
Appeals. That court said that on the record the case was one
"where the proof might be regarded as sufficient to sustain the
ground upon which the motion was evidently made, but there is
wanting in the record a sufficient statement of those grounds to
permit the introduction of proof." A petition for rehearing was denied by the Court of Appeals, after being advised of the error in
transmitting the record. In the Supreme Court the judgment was
reversed under Neal vs. Delaware, Carter vs. Texas and Norris
vs. Alabama, heretofore discussed.
In 1935 Lloyd Gaines, a Negro, was refused admission to the
Law School of 'the University of Missouri on the ground that it
was "contrary to the constitution, laws and public policy to admit
a Negro as a student at the University of Missouri." On his application for relief the Missouri courts denied a writ of mandamus
to require his admission as applied for. He was a graduate of
Lincoln University, an institution maintained by the state for the
higher education of Negroes, and it was admitted that his work
' 89Hale v. Kentucky, (1938) 303 U. S. 613, 58 S. Ct. 753, 82 L. Ed. 1050.
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and credits there would qualify him for the Law School of the
University of Missouri, if otherwise eligible. It was not questioned
that the action of exclusion was the action of the state. Lincoln
University did not have a law school, but there had been what the
Supreme Court of Missouri styled "a legislative purpose to
establish" one "whenever necessary and practicable." Section 9622,
R. S. Mo., 1929, was as follows: "Pending the full development
of the Lincoln University, the board of curators shall have authority
to arrange for the attendance of Negro residents of the State of
Missouri at the University of any adjacent state to take any course
or to study any subjects provided for at the State University of
Missouri, and which are not taught at the Lincoln University, and
to pay the reasonable tuition fees for such attendance." Petitioner
was advised to apply for aid under this statute, which apparently,
he did not do. In Gaines vs. Canada,Registrar,Etc.,190 the Court,
speaking by Chief Justice Hughes, said that the state had recognized
its obligation "to provide Negroes with advantages for higher
education substantially equal to the advantages furnished to white
students," and had "sought to fulfill that obligation by furnishing
equal facilities in separate schools, a method the validity of which
has been sustained by our decisions." He cited Plessy vs. Ferguson, McCabe vs. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., Gong Lurn vs. Rice, and
Cuinming vs. Board of Education, cases heretofore discussed in
this study. It was held, however, that the facilities offered were
not equal. "The white resident is afforded legal education within
the state; the Negro resident having the same qualifications is
refused it there and must go outside the state to obtain it. That is
a denial of the equality of legal right to the enjoyment of the
privilege which the state has set up, and the provision for the payment of tuition fees in another state does not remove the discrimination. The equal protection of the laws is 'a pledge of the protection of equal laws.'" The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Missouri was reversed and the case remanded for "further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." Justices McReynolds
and Butler dissented, citing the Cumming and Gong Lur cases.
The writer ventures the suggestion that this case leaves still
without direct and specific determination the right of a state to
require separation of the white and negro races in the publicly
supported institutions of learning. On analysis all the cases cited
head up in Plessy vs. Ferguson, and there the forms of discrimination before the Court did not include public education. The practice
190(1938) 305 U. S. 337, 59 S. Ct. 232, 83 L. Ed. 208.
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existing, and locally approved in certain states, of separation in
public schools, was referred to arguendo as supporting the view
of the majority; but the precise point was not and never had been
presented to the Court. Is there no ground for contending that
discriminations which are (as decided) permissible in such contacts between the races as were before the Court in Plessy vs. Ferguson, are otherwise in tax-supported educational institutions?
Pierre vs. Louisiana,1' 1 decided in February 1939, went even
further than Norris vs. Alabama,192 in looking behind the findings
of the state courts to determine whether there had been actual discrimination in the drawing of the grand jury returning an indictment against a Negro for murder. The alleged facts were extreme
and undisputed, and the trial court had quashed the petit jury
panel for unlawful discrimination. Both grand and petit juries
had been drawn from the same general venire, but the judge held
that discrimination in selecting the former did not affect the constitutional rights of the defendant. A new petit jury panel was
drawn and defendant was tried and convicted. On appeal the State
Supreme Court considered the evidence submitted on the motion
to quash and decided that it was insufficient, and that the trial
court had erred in requiring a new petit jury panel. Justice Black,
speaking for the Court, said: "In our consideration of the facts
the conclusions reached by the Supreme Court of Louisiana are
entitled to great respect. Yet, when a claim is properly assertedas in this case-that a citizen whose life is at stake has been denied
the equal protection of his country's laws on account of his race,
it becomes our solemn duty to make independent inquiry and
determination of the disputed facts."' 95 A reversal was ordered and
9
there was no dissent. 4
After Guinn vs. United States,'95 the resourceful Oklahoma
legislature tried again. In February, 1916, it passed a law (Section
5654 Oklahoma Stats. 1931) the nature of %ihichis thus stated in
the syllabus of Lane vs. Wilson:9 6 "Oklahoma statutes made registration prerequisite to voting, and provided generally that all citizens
391(1939) 306 U. S. 354, 59 S. Ct. 536, 83 L. Ed. 757.
92
' See p. 275, suPra.
i93At p. 358 of 306 U. S. See the closely parallel cases of Smith v.
Texas, (1940) 311 U. S. 128, 61 S. Ct. 164, 85 L. Ed. 84 (opinion again by
Black, J.), and Hill v. Texas, (1942) 316 U. S. 400, 62 S. Ct. 1159, 86 L.
Ed. 1559
(opinion by Stone, C. J.).
' 94Justice Cardozo, deceased, bad been succeeded by justice Frankfurter
from 95
Massachusetts.
' See p. 268, supra.
196(1939) 307 U. S. 268, 59 S. Ct. 872, 83 L. Ed. 1281.
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qualified to vote in 1916 who failed to register between April 30
and May 11, 1916, should be perpetually disfranchised, excepting
those who voted in 1914. The effect was that white people who
were on the lists in 1914 in virtue of the provision of the Oklahoma
Constitution, called the 'Grandfather Clause,' which this Court in
1915 adjudged unconstitutional ... were entitled to vote; whereas
colored people kept from registering and voting by that clause
would remain forever disfranchised unless they applied for registration during the limited period of not more than 12 days." Lane,
a Negro citizen of Oklahoma, was qualified for voting in 1916 but
was not then registered and had not applied for registration within
the 12-day period. He sued, under U. S. R. S. Section 1979, three
election officials for declining to register him in 1934. His action
for damages was brought in the United States District Court,
which directed a verdict for defendants. This action was affirmed
by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme
Court, speaking by Justice Frankfurter, reversed. Justices Mc7
Reynolds and Butler dissented without opinion; Justice Douglas1
took no part. The Court, for reasons incident to Oklahoma statutes
and procedure, recognized plaintiff's right to come into a Federal
Court before exhausting his remedies in the state courts. Said
Justice Frankfurter: "The Amendment (i. e., the 15th) nullifies
sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination. It
bits onerous procedural requirements which effectively handicap
exercise of the franchise by the colored race although the abstract
right to vote may remain unrestricted as to race ... The practical effect of the 1916 legislation was to accord to the members of the Negro
race who had been discriminated against in the outlawed registration system of 1914, not more than 12 days within which to reassert
constitutional rights which this Court found in the Guinn case to
have been improperly taken from them. We believe that the opportunity thus given Negro voters to free themselves from the
effects of discrimination to which they should never have been
subjected was too cabined and confined. The restrictions imposed
must be judged with reference to those for whom they were designed. It must be remembered that we are dealing with a body
of citizens lacking the habits and traditions of political independence
and otherwise living in circumstances which do not encourage
initiation and enterprise."' 198
19 7Appointed from Connecticut, just before the argument of the case,

to succeed Justice Brandeis.

'SSAt pp. 275, 276, of 307 U. S.
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Chambers et al vs. Florida,199 was closely parallel to Brown vs.
2°
Mississippi,
" although the means by which confessions were secured
were not shown to have included physical violence. Justice Black,
speaking for the Court (Justice Murphy did not sit in the case)
said: "The record develops a sharp conflict upon the issue of
physical violence and mistreatment, but shows, without conflict,
the dragnet methods of arrest on suspicion without warrant, and
the protracted questioning and cross questioning of these ignorant
young tenant farmers by state officers and other white citizens, in
a fourth floor jail room, where as prisoners they were without
friends, advisors or counselors, and under circumstances calculated
to break the strongest nerves and the stoutest resistance. 2 0 ' The
right of the Court to.go behind the verdict of the jury in the state
court, which had found the confessions to be voluntary, was
specifically challenged by the State of Florida, and on this point
the Court declared: "Since petitioners have reasonably asserted
the right under the Federal Constitution to have their guilt or innocence of a capital crime determined without reliance upon confessions obtained by means proscribed by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, we must determine independently
whether petitioners' confessions were so obtained, by a review of
the facts upon which that issue necessarily turns.."20 2 The case went
beyond Brown vs. Mississippi in that, although Chambers' conviction was supported not only by his own confession but the testimony of three other "confessors" who pleaded guilty, the judgment
below was reversed.
"Jim Crow" again came before the Court, and this time under
different auspices but quite conspicuously, in Mitchell vs. United
States.203 Appellant, a Negro member of Congress from Illinois,
took passage at Chicago for Hot Springs, Arkansas, over the lines
of the Illinois Central and Rock Island Railways, holding a firstclass round-trip ticket. He was furnished Pullman car accommodations until shortly after the train entered Arkansas, when he was
required by the conducter, over his protest and under threat of
arrest, to move into the car provided for colored passengers, in
purported compliance with an Arkansas statute requiring segregation of colored from white persons by the use of cars or partitioned
sections providing "equal but separate and sufficient accommoda199(1940) 309 U. S. 227, 60 S. Ct. 472, 82 L. Ed. 716.
20
oSee-p. 276, supra.
201At p. 228 of 309 U. S.
202At p. 228 of 309 U. S.
203(1941) 313 U. S. 80, 61 S. Ct. 873, 85 L. Ed. 1201.
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tion" for both races. He made a complaint to the Interstate Commerce Commission, pursuant to provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act which made it unlawful for a common carrier subject to
the Act "to subject any particular person .. to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respectwhatsoever." The
Commission made findings of fact and dismissed the complaint, five
Commissioners dissenting. Mitchell then brought suit to set aside
the Commission's order. Three judges sitting in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found the facts
as stated in the Commission's findings, and that they supported its
findings. The court held, however, that itwaswithout jurisdiction and
dismissed the complaint on that ground. The case then came to the
Supreme Court on direct appeal. It was hotly contested. The United
States Attorney General filed a memorandum against the judgment
below, and in addition to counsel for appellees the AttorneysGeneral of ten Southern states filed briefs. The Court, speaking by
Chief Justice Hughes, set aside the order of the Commission, basing
this conclusion on the violation of the Act, and declining to consider
the briefs of the Attorneys-General of the several states, which discussed the general question of segregation under the 14th Amendment. Said the Chief Justice: "The undisputed facts showed conclusively that, having paid a first-class fare for the entire journey
from Chicago to Hot Springs, and having offered to pay the proper
charge for a seat which was available in the Pullman car for the
trip from Memphis to Hot Springs, he was compelled, in accordance
with custom, to leave that car and to ride in a second-class car and
was thus denied the standard conveniences and privileges afforded
to first-class passengers. This was manifestly a discrimination
against him in the course of his interstate journey, and admittedly
that discrimination was based solely on the fact that he was a
Negro. The question whther this was a discrimination forbidden by
the Interstate Commerce Act is not a question of segregation but
one of equality of treatment. The denial to appellant of equality of
accommodations because of his race would be an invasion of a fundamental individual right which is guaranteed against state action
by the Fourteenth Amendment (citing McCabe vs. Ry. Co. and
Gainesvs. C'aiada,20 4 ) and in view of the nature of the right and of
our constitutional policy it cannot be maintained that the discrimination as it was alleged was not essentially unjust. In that aspect it
could not be deemed to lie outside the purview of the sweeping pro20

4See pp. 268, 282, supra.
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hibitions of the Interstate Commerce Act." The decision - was
unanimous."'
VIII
CHIEF JUSTICE STONE

"Peonage" came up again in 1942, in Taylor vs. Georgia.20 The

case was closely parellel to Bailey vs. Alabama 70 which was followed without dissent, Justice Byrnes writing the opinion. The
personnel of the Court had changed completely since the Bailey
case. 20

It does not specifically appear that Taylor was a Negro,

but that is probable. This is also true of the person alleged to have
been wronged in United States vs. Gaskin.20 9 Here the appellee
had been indicted under Section 269 of the Criminal Code in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida
for arresting one Johnson "to a condition of peonage." A demurrer
to the indictment was sustained and the United States appealed.
It was held, Justice Roberts writing the opinion, that Section 269
should be construed so as to cover an arrest with intent to hold a
person in peonage. Justice Murphy dissented, on the ground that
this construction was too broad for application to a criminal
statute. 10
Smith vs. Allwright 211 is a case of such importance as to call
for rather full presentation. The question involved was the same
which was before the Court in Grovey vs. Townsend.212 Smith, a
Negro, had brought suit for damages under a Federal statute, on
account of denial of his right to vote at a Democratic primary in
Texas, and relief had been denied by the lower Federal Courts.
The Court, speaking by. Justice Reed, said: "The statutes of Texas
relating to primaries and the resolution of the Democratic party
of Texas extending the privilege of membership to white citizens
only are the same in substance and effect today as they were when
Grovey vs. Townsend was decided by a unanimous court. The
question as to whether the exclusionary action of the party was
20

JustiCe Murphy, appointed from Michigan, had succeeded Justice
Butler, deceased.
206(1942) 315 U. S. 25, 62 S. Ct. 415, 86 L. Ed. 615.
20
See p. 263, supra.
208
Chief Justice Hughes and Justice McReynolds had retired in 1941,
and Justice Byrnes and Justice Jackson were appointed from South Carolina
and New York respectively.
-09 (1944) 320 U. S. 527, 64 S. Ct. 31, 88 L. Ed. 287.
210
Justice Byrnes had resigned and Justice Rutledge had been appointed
from Iowa.
211(1944) 321 U. S. 649, 64 S. Ct. 757, 88 L. Ed. 987.
212

See p. 276, supra.
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the action of the state persists as the determinative factor. In again
entering upon consideration of the inference to be drawn as to
state action from a substantially similar factual situation, it should
be noted that Grovey vs. Tozunsend upheld exclusion of Negroes
from primaries through the denial of party membership by a party
convention. A few years before, this Court refused approval of
exclusion by the State Executive Committee of the party. A different result was reached on the theory that the Committee action
was state authorized and the Convention action was unfettered by
statutory control. Such a variation of the result from so slight a
change in form influences us to consider anew the legal validity of
the distinction which has resulted in barring Negroes from participating in the nomination of the Democratic party in Texas.
• .. Despite Texas' decision that the exclusion is produced by
private or party action. .

.

. Federal courts must for themselves

appraise the facts leading to that conclusion. It is only by the
performance of this obligation that a final and uniform interpretation can be given to the Constitution, the 'supreme law of the
land.' "213 After examination of the Texas electoral system the
Court concludes: "We think that this statutory system for the
selection of party nominees for inclusion on the general election
ballot makes the party which is required to follow these legislative
laws an agency of the state in so far as it determines the participants in a primary election . .. This is state action within the
meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment . . . In reaching this con-

clusion we are not unmindful of the desirability of continuity of
decision in constitutional questions. However, when convinced of
former error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow
precedent. In constitutional questions, where correction depends
upon amendment and not upon legislative action this Court throughout its history has freely exercised its power to re-examine the
basis of its constitutional decisions . . . This is particularly true

when the decision believed erroneous is the application of a constitutional principle rather than -aninterpretation of the Constitution
to extract the principle thereof ... Grovey vs. Townsend is over-

ruled. Judgment reversed." 21 4 Justice Frankfurter concurred in
the result, and Justice Roberts dissented. 21 5

In

his dissenting

2

-3At pp. 661, 662, of 321 U. S.
pp. 663, 664, of 321 U. S.

214At

21

SThe groundwork for this decision had been laid in 1941 in United
States v. Classic, (1941) 313 U. S. 299, 61 S. Ct. 1031, 85 L. Ed. 1368, an
election fraud case from Louisiana, not involving negroes. Stone, J., presented
an elaborate opinion, and Douglas, Black and Murphy, JJ., dissented.
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opinion Justice Roberts made rather heated comments on the
reversal of Grovey vs. Townsend, a decision reached by a unanimous
Court (the opinion being written by himself) of which he and the
Chief Justice were the only members sitting in the instant case. "In
Mannich vs. Southern Steamship Co., 321 U. S. 96, 105," he said
"I have expressed my views with respect to the present policy of
the Court freely to disregard and to overrule considered decisions
and the rules of law announced in them. This tendency, it seems to
me, indicates an intolerance for what those who have composed
this Court in the past have conscientiously and deliberately concluded, and involves an assumption that knowledge and wisdom
reside in us which was denied to our predecessors .

.

. The reason

for my concern is that the instant decision, overruling that an.nounced about nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this
tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for
this day and train only. I have no assurance, in view of current
decisions, that the opinion atinounced today may not shortly be
repudiated and overruled by Justices who deem they have new
light on the subject ...

It is regrettable that in an era marked by

doubt and confusion, an era whose greatest need is steadfastness
of thought and purpose, this Court, which has been looked upon as
exhibiting consistency in adjudication, and a steadiness which
would hold the balance even in the face of temporary ebbs and
flows of opinion, should now itself become the breeder of fresh
doubt and confusion in the public mind as to the stability of our
institutions."

21

6

The latest appearance of peonage in the Supreme Court was
the very interesting case of Pollock vs. Williams, 17 decided in
April, 1944. The lawyer's humanitarian inclinations will be gratified
by the solicitude for human rights shown in the majority opinion of
Justice Jackson, and from his professional viewpoint he cannot read
without admiration the keen criticism of Justice Reed's dissent,
in which the Chief Justice joined; while the layman who can follow
the technical points in the two opinions cannot fail to observe the
intellectual integrity with Which equally acute and learned .judges
may reach opposite conclusions on complicated legal questions.
Pollock, a Negro, was charged under a Florida statute substantially identical with those which were considered in the Bailey
and Taylor cases218 with fraudulently obtaining $5 under a con216At pp. 666, 669, and 670, of 321 U. S.
322 U. S. 4,64 S. Ct. 792, 88 L. Ed. 1095.
See pp. 263 and 288, supra.

21(1944)

218
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tract for labor. On the day of his arrest he was taken before a
county judge and upon his plea of guilty was sentenced to pay
a fine of $100 or be imprisoned for 60 days in the county jail,-$20
for each dollar of his debt with the alternative of serving time at
the rate of about 9 cents per day. In his uncontradicted petition
for a writ of habeas corpus he says he was without funds and unable to employ counsel, did not know he had a right to have counsel
appointed, and understood that if he owed money to his former
employer and quit without paying it he was guilty of the charge.
On appeal the state circuit court held the statute in question to
be unconstitutional, but the State Supreme Court reversed. Justice
Jackson analyzed the peonage cases mentioned in this study and
reviewed at considerable length the general subject of peonage
in the United States. 219 As in the Bailey and Taylor cases the state
statute was treated as a whole, and with the presumption feature
was held to be violative of the 13th Amendment. In the Florida
Supreme Court the case turned upon the appellant's plea of guilty
in the trial court. On this point Justice Jackson said: "We cannot
doubt that the presumption provision had a coercive effect in
producing the plea of guilty . . .No one questions that we clearly

have held that such a presumption is prohibited by the Constitution
and the Federal statute. The Florida legislature has enacted and
twice re-enacted it since we so held. We cannot assume it was
doing an idle thing. Since the presumption was known to be unconstitutional and of no use in a contested case, the only explanation
we can find for its persistent appearance in the statute is its extralegal coercive effect in suppressing defenses. It confronted this
defendant. There was every probability that a law so recently
(1943) and repeatedly enacted would be followed by the trial
court, whose judge was not required to be a lawyer. The possibility
of obtaining relief by appeal was not bright, as the event proved,
for Pollock had to come all the way to this Court, and was required,
and quite regularly, to post a supersedeas bond of $500, a hundred
times the amount of the debt. He was an illiterate Negro laborer
in the toils of the law for the want of $5. Such considerations
bear importantly on the decision of a prisoner, even if aided by
counsel, as Pollock was not, whether to plead guilty and hope for
21 0
Northerners should not be too smug in their criticism of the South
in this regard. The lumber interests of Maine and Minnesota seem to have
sought protection in like manner. In Minnesota obtaining transportation with
intent to defraud is a misdemeanor, and since 1901 the statute has declared
that failure to do the work contracted for shall be prima facie evidence of
fraudulent intent (Minn. St. 1941, Chap. 620.64).
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leniency, or to fight. It is plain that, had his plight after conviction
not aroused outside help, Pollock himself would never have been
heard of in any appellate court ...We think that a state which
maintains such a law in the face of the court decisions we have
recited may not be heard to say that a plea of guilty under the
circumstances is not due to pressure of its statutory threat to con220
vict him on this presumption."
Lyons vs. Oklahoma,221 decided in June, 1944, involved the
admission of an alleged involuntary confession 'in a trial for murder. The petitioner (defendant below) was a Negro. Although that
does not appear in the report it doubtless had much to do with the
fact that the case received much publicity. It is included here rather
for that reason than because it is of importance in this review.
Lyons made two confessions the same day, the first admittedly
involuntary. Justice Reed, who delivered the opinion of the Court
sustaining the conviction, said the issue was "the voluntary character
of the second confession under the circumstances which existed at
the time and place of its signature and, particularly, because of the
alleged continued influence of the unlawful inducements which
vitiated the prior confession." The question presented was one of
fact, and it was held that the evidence warranted the conclusion
that the effects of the coercion which procured the earlier confession had been dissipated prior to the second one, and that the
latter was voluntary. The conviction, therefore, could not be set
aside as contrary to "that fundamental fairness essential to the
very concept of justice," the absence of which amounts to a denial
of "due process." Justice Murphy recorded a vigorous protest in
which Justice Black concurred. Justice Rutledge dissented without
222
opinion, and Justice Douglas concurred in the result.
Bester Steele had worked his way up to be a locomotive fireman
for the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. By "established practice"
only white firemen could be promoted to be engineers, and he had
a black skin. But he had won a place in a "passenger pool,"-a highly
desirable position, and had valuable seniority rights. Under the
Railway Labor Act the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and
Enginemen was the exclusive representative of the craft for pur2

20At pp. 115, 116, of 322 U. S.
221(1944) 322 U. S. 596, 64 S. Ct. 1208, 88 L. Ed. 1481.
1n Ashcraft v. Tennessee, (1944) 322 U. S. 145, 64 S. Ct. 921, 88
L. Ed. 1192, decided a few weeks before the Lyons case, the propriety of
the Court's interference with convictions obtained in state courts on enforced confessions was argued quite fully in the majority opinion by Justice
Black and in the minority opinion by Justice Jackson. One of the defendants
was a negro, but no discrimination on that ground was suggested.
2 22
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poses of bargaining. The majority of the firemen in the employ
of the railroad company were white; but there was a substantial
minority of Negroes, all of whom were excluded from membership
in the Brotherhood, and they could have no bargaining representative other than that organization. Without giving the Negroes
notice or allowing them an opportunity to be heard the Brotherhood entered into new agreements with the company, providing
that vacancies as they occurred should be filled by white men, and
restricting the seniority rights of Negro firemen, with the avowed
purpose of ultimately excluding all Negroes from the service. As
these agreements were worked out Steele lost a substantial amount
of time, was assigned to harder and less remunerative work and
later put on a switch engine. He brought suit on behalf of himself
and other Negro employees in like situation, as provided in the
Railway Labor Act, 4 Stat. 1185, 45 U. S. C. Sec. 151 et seq.,
for injunctive and other appropriate relief. A circuit court in
Alabama sustained a demurrer to the complaint, and the State
Supreme Court affirmed. The case excited much interest and the
Government appealed, briefs being also filed by the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the
American Civil Liberties Union as amici curiae. The decision in
Supreme Court was rendered in December, 1944.223
The Court, speaking by the Chief Justice, stated the question
to be whether the Railway Labor Act "imposes on a labor organization, acting by authority of the statute as the exclusive bargaining
representative of a craft or class of railway employees, the duty
to represent all the employees in the craft without discrimination
because of their race, and if so, whether the Courts have jurisdiction
to protect the minority of this craft or class from the violation of
such obligation." In discussing this question the Court said: "If,
as the state court has held, the Act confers this power on the
bargaining representative of a craft or class of employees without
any commensurate statutory duty toward the members, constitutional questions arise . . . If the Railway Labor Act purports to

impose on petitioner and the other Negro members of the craft
the legal duty to comply with the terms of a contract whereby the
representative has discriminatorily restricted their employment for
the benefit and advantage of the Brotherhood's own members, we
must decide the constitutional questions which petitioner raises in
his pleading." The constitutional questions were not considered,
223
Steele v. L. & N. R. R. Co., (1944) 323 U. S. 192, 65 S. Ct. 226,
89 L. Ed. 173.
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for it was held that the agreements were violative of the terms of the
Act, and the judgment of the Alabama court was reversed. In a
concurring opinion Justice Murphy went somewhat further: "The
economic discrimination against Negroes practiced by the Brotherhood and the railroad under color of Congressional authority raises
a grave constitutional question which should be squarely faced.
The utter disregard for the dignity and the well-being of colored
citizens shown by this record is so pronounced as to demand the
invocation of constitutional condemnation. To decide the case and
analyze the statute solely upon the basis of legal niceties, while
remaining mute and placid as to the obvious and oppressive
deprivation of constitutional guarantees, is to make the judicial
function something less than it should be. The constitutional problem inherent in this instance is clear ... It cannot be assumed that

Congress meant to authorize the representative to act so as to
ignore the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Otherwise the
Act would bear the stigma of unconstitutionality under the Fifth
Amendment in this respect. For that reason I am willing to read
the statute as not permitting or allowing any action by the bargaining
representative in the exercise of its delegated powers which would
in effect violate the constitutional rights of individuals. If the
Court's construction of the statute rests upon this basis, I agree.
But I am not sure that such is the basis... The Constitution voices
its disapproval whenever economic discrimination is applied under
authority of law against any race, creed or color. A sound democracy cannot allow such discrimination to go unchallenged. Racism
is far too virulent today to permit the slightest refusal, in the light
of a Constitution that abhors it, to expose and condemn it wherever
224
it appears in the course of a statutory interpretation.
On January 29, 1943, Claude Screws, a Georgia sheriff, aided
by his deputy and a policeman, arrested Robert Hall, a Negro, on
a warrant charging theft of a tire. Hall, while handcuffed, was
beaten with a two-pound blackjack 15 to 30 minutes until he was
unconscious. He was then dragged, feet-foremost, into the jail and
died from his injuries within an hour. There was no action in the
Georgia courts; but Screws and his associates were prosecuted in
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia
under SeCtions 20 and 37 of the Federal Criminal Code, the former
making it a 'criminal offense wilfully to deprive a person, "under
color of law," of "rights, privileges or immunities" secured to him
224At pp. 208, 209, of 323 U. S. ,
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by the Constitution and laws of the United States; the latter covering conspiracy for such violation. The defendants claimed that
Hall reached for a gun (though handcuffed!) and used insulting
language. They were convicted by a jury on both counts, and fines
totalling $1,000, with imprisonment for three years were imposed
on each defendant. After affirmance in the Circuit Court of Appeals,
225
the case went to the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari.
Section 20, on which the prosecution was based, is as
follows: "Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation or custom, wilfully subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any inhabitant of any State, Territory or District to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an
alien, or by reason of his color or race, than are prescribed for the
punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000, or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both." This section is the
amended survivor of Sections 1 and 2 of the original Civil Rights
Act. 26 The "rights" charged to have been violated were the right
not to be deprived of life without due process of law, and the
right to be tried upon the charge on which Hall was arrested by
due process of law,--rights claimed to be secured to him by the
14th Amendment. The case did not involve any charge of discrimination against Hall because he was a Negro; so far as strictly legal
points were involved he might have been a white man. But the case
has a proper place in this study, for obviously Screws would have
been prosecuted in the State Courts if Hall had been white. The
Supreme Court was split four ways, Justice Douglas writing the
prevailing opinion, in which the Chief justice and Justices Black
and Reed concurred. They were able to reach an interpretation of
the statute under which its constitutionality could be upheld, but
at the expense of finding error in the charge, on which ground they
reversed although no exception to the charge had been taken in
the trial court.
Justice Murphy, in a conspicuously clear and untechnical opinion
stood for an unqualified affirmance. Justices Roberts, Frankfurter
and Jackson presented a joint opinion arguing vigorously for reversal on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the statute as
rightly interpreted. Justice Rutledge indicated at length his agreement with Justice Murphy, but, in order that the case might be
Z2 5Screws v. U. S., (1945) 325 U. S. 91, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 89 L. Ed. 1495.
221See Blyew v. U. S., supra, p. 224.
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disposed of, voted with those who took Justice Douglas' view of
the case.
No useful purpose would be served by an attempt to analyze
here the different opinions in so far as they deal with the interpretation of the statute and its constitutionality. But the case is
interesting for the light it throws upon the personality of the different
members of the court, and upon the administration of criminal
justice in Georgia. Why were not 'Screws and his co-defendants
prosecuted in the state courts? Justice Murphy remarks: "States
are undoubtedly capable of punishing their officers who commit
such outrages. But where, as here, the states are unwilling for some
reason to prosecute such crimes the federal government must step
in unless constitutional guaranties are to become atrophied."
Justices Frankfurter, Roberts and Jackson say: "Instead of leaving
this misdeed to vindication by Georgia law, the United States deflected Georgia's responsibility by instituting a federal prosecution."
"After all, Georgia citizens sitting as a grand jury indicted and
other Georgia citizens sitting as a Federal trial jury convicted
Screws and his associates; and it was a Georgia judge who charged
more strongly against them than this Court thinks he should have."
At the trial the Solicitor General of the Albany Circuit in the State
of Georgia, which includes the county where the crime occurred,
testified: "There has been no complaint filed with me in connection
with the death of Bobby Hall against Sheriff Screws, Jones and
Kelley... As to whom I depend (on) for investigation of matters
that come into my court, I am an attorney. I am not a detective
and depend on evidence that is available after I come to court or
get into the case ...I rely on my sheriffs and policemen and peace
officers, and private citizens also who prosecute each other, to
investigate the charges that are lodged in court."
What appears to be an authoritative statement of the course
followed by the Department of Justice is as follows: "The case
was brought to the attention of the Civil Rights Section by a Negro
newspaper and the local United States Attorney, and while the
usual investigatory machinery of the Department of Justice was
at once set in motion there is evidence in the Department's file of
the case that every effort was made to encourage the State of
Georgia to prosecute the offenders. The reasons for Georgia's
failure to take any action in such an extreme case are not entirely
clear; for one thing the Georgia Solicitor General for that district
whose duty it was to start proceedings in such a case is reported
to have felt 'helpless in the matter.' 'He has no investigative facilities
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and has to rely on the sheriff and policemen of the various counties
of his circuit for investigation.' Here, such assistance would have
had to come from the accused persons themselves! At any rate, the
United States Attorney, with the approval of the Justice Department, finally brought the case to the attention of he Federal grand
jury and in April an indictment was secured.

' 22 7

In his concluding

comment this writer says, after an illuminating review of the case,
"The Screws case shows how the use of the statute can be successfully combined with the general 'conspiracy' statute (18 U. S.
C. A. Sec. 88, F. C. A. title 18, Sec. 88) to make possible increased
penalties if a conviction is secured, but such penalties are still far
out of line with the enormity of such .a crime as that committed
by the defendants in this case. Sooner or later Congress must provide new legislation if the civil rights program of the Department
of Justice is to develop in a normal and desirable way. In the
meantime Screws vs. United States clears away constitutional
doubts about such a program and makes possible continued use of
statutory tools, however imperfect they may be. This is of first
importance if one accepts the premise that in the never-ending struggle to make civil liberty in America more secure the positive employment of Federal power toward that end is a weapon that can
prove exceedingly useful."
Akins vs. TexaS 28 is found upon analysis to be more interesting
as it discloses the mental processes of the learned and astute men
who sit in the highest of our courts than it is important as a precedent. Akins, a Negro, was tried in a Texas court and sentenced to
death for murder. The conviction was affirmed in the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals. "Certiorari was allowed because of the importance in the administration of criminal justice of the alleged
racial discrimination (in the selection of grand jurors) which was
relied upon to support the claim of violation of constitutional
rights." Justice Reed wrote the prevailing opinion. Justice Rutledge
concurred in the result. Justice Murphy wrote a dissenting opinion.
The Chief Justice and Justice Black also dissented, but without
opinions.
Under the Texas statutes jury commissioners appointed by the
judge of the trial court select a list of 16 grand-jurymen, from
which list 12 are chosen as a grand jury for a current term of court.
227

Robert K. Carr, Screws v. United States-The Police Brutality
Case, 31 Cornell Law Quar. 48 (1945). See also Julius Cohen, The Screws
Case: Federal Protection of Negro Rights, 46 Col. Law Rev. 94 (1946).
228(1945) 325 U. S. 398, 65 S. Ct. 1276, 89 L. Ed. 1692.

M1INNESOTA LAW REVIEW

juries. Where jury commissioners limit those from whom grand
jurors are selected to their own personal acquaintance, discrimination can arise from commissioners who know no Negroes as well
as from commissioners who know but eliminate them. If there has
been discrimination, whether accomplished ingeniously or in234
genuously, the conviction cannot stand." And in Hill vs. Texas,
the Chief Justice uses language of like import. Justice Murphy
says in his dissenting opinion: "The equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment entitles every person whose life, liberty
or property is in issue, to the benefits of grand and petit juries
chosen without regard to race, color or creed." 235 And he concludes
as follows: "Clearer proof of intentional and deliberate limitation
on the basis of color would be difficult to produce. The commissioners' declaration that they did not intend to discriminate and
their other inconsistent statements cited by the Court fade into
insignificance beside the admitted and obvious fact that they intended to and did limit the number of Negroes on the jury panel.
By limiting the number to one they thereby excluded the possibility
that two or more Negroes might be among the persons qualified to
serve. All except the one Negro were required to be of white color.
At the same time, by insisting upon one Negro they foreclosed the
possibility of choosing sixteen white men on the panel. They refused, in brief, to disregard the factor of color in selecting the jury
personnel. To that extent they have disregarded petitioner's right
to the equal protection of the laws. To that extent they have ignored
the ideals of our jury system. Our affirmance of this judgment thus
tarnishes the fact that we of this nation are one people undivided in
ability or freedom by differences of race, color or creed. ' 23 6
Also in June, 1945, there was decided Railway Mail Association vs. Corsi,2'7 an appeal from a state declaratory judgment interpreting certain sections of the New York Civil Rights Law. By
these sections every labor organization was forbidden to deny to
any person membership or equal treatment by reason of his race,
color or creed. Appellant was an organization of postal clerks which
limited its membership to persons "of the Caucasian race" and native American Indians. It claimed that it was not a labor organization within the meaning of the law; and that, if it should be found
to be such, the sections under consideration violated the due process
and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment, and were in
234See p. 284, footnote 193.
235At p.409 of 325 U. S.
236At p. 410 of 325 U. S.
237(1945) 326 U. S. 88, 65 S. Ct. 1483, 89 L. Ed. 2072.
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conflict with the federal power over post offices and post roads.
All these points were found against the Association in an opinion
written by Justice Reed. Concerning "due process" he said: "We,
have here a prohibition of discrimination in membership or union
services on account of race, creed or color. A judicial determination
that such legislation violated the Fourteenth Amendment would be
a distortion of the policy manifested in that amendment which was
adopted to prevent state legislation designed to perpetuate discrimination on the basis of race or color. We see no constitutional basis
for the contention that a state cannot protect workers from exclusion solely on the basis of race, color or creed by an organization
functioning under the protection of the state, which holds itself
out to represent the general business needs of the employees." Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion used broader and more
emphatic language: "It is urged that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment precludes the State of New York
from prohibiting racial and religious discrimination against those
seeking employment. Elaborately to argue against this contention
is to dignify a claim devoid of constitutional substance. Of course
a state may leave abstention from such discriminations to the conscience of individuals. On the other hand, a state may choose to
put its authority behind one of the cherished aims of American
feeling by forbidding indulgence in racial or religious prejudice to
another's hurt. To use the Fourteenth Amendment as a sword
against such state power would stultify the Amendment. Certainly
the insistence by individuals on their private prejudices as to race,
color or creed, in relations like those now before us, ought not to
have a higher constitutional sanction than the determination of the
state to extend the area of non-discrimination beyond that which
the Constitution itself exacts." Justice Rutledge concurred in the
result.
Ix.
SUMMARY

Probably those who have followed this review have not been
able to trace any uninterrupted tendency in the decisions; and yet
it must be clear that the general trend has been toward an in-creasingly liberal recognition of the civil and political rights of
Afro-American citizens as such. No attempt has been made or will
be made here to explore the sources of the main current, or to account for the eddies and counter-currents in its flow. Neither will
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the writer undertake the ambitious task of formulating in propositions of law the legal conclusions which are to be drawn from the
cases presented. In many instances the questions considered have
centered in the three War Amendments. In many the result has depended on the Court's application of other constitutional provisions and of fundamental principles of the unwritten law. In the
latter group we have not so much an interpretation of the law as an
inquiry whether the circufnstances of the case bring it vithin a
well settled rule. Here the fact that the right in question is claimed
for a Negro is of importance only for its bearing -on the general attitude of the Court, and its relation to the background of local sentiment and conditions out of which the case emerged. Recognizing inevitable differences of viewpoint in a Court of nine members, we
find in this field an impartial and painstaking effort to do justice
according to law. For Negroes accused of atrocious crimes there
has been insistence that they must have all the safeguards in indictment, trial and protection while in custody which the law provides for others. Well established limitations of the Court's jurisdiction should be borne in mind.
Concerning the 13th Amendment Kelly Miller, an acknowledged spokesman for the Negro race, said in 1928: "The 13th
Amendment is upheld and respected by the government and the
American people." It has been declared by the Court to be selfexecuting, to furnish redress against the oppressive "peonage" system, and to provide support for civil and political rights more specifically guaranteed by the other Amendments.
Vigorous complaints have been made by Negro leaders against
decisions of the Court under the 15th Amendment: "The Negro
lost the right to vote conferred on him by the 14th and 15th Amendments because the Supreme Court through hair-splitting sophistry
and astute evasion emasculated both Amendments to the point of
nullification.... More than once he took his case to the Supreme
Court of the United States, but the Court pointed out that he had
failed to show that the state had abridged or denied his right to
vote, or that persons who had prevented him from voting had done
so because of his race, color or previous condition of seruitude. So,
unable to prove that the committee which had met him at the polls
with shotguns was actuated by any such base and unconstitutional
motives, he found his case thrown out. In the last analysis he lost'
his right to vote because of the attitude of the Supreme Court." 238
23S8James Weldon Johnson, Negro Americans, What Now? (1935)

39, 57.
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Whatever color or justification for these bitter words of a cultured and self-respecting Negro may be found in a few cases, notably Reeves and Cruikshank, it should not be forgotten, even by
laymen, that often constitutional principles recognized as sound
and just cannot be applied to the particular case before the Court
because of defects in the implementing federal statute, the terms
in which the question is presented by the record, 'or the factual
foundation on which the decision must be based. At any rate, since
Smith vs. Allwright, if blame for Negro disfranchisement is to be
traced to the national government, it would seem that Congress
rather than the Court must bear the burden. A legislative act found
defective may be susceptible of remedy, and the 2nd Section of the
14th Amendment furnishes Congress with a weapon which has
never been tried. The Court has consistently held that the 15th
Amendment does not confer a right of suffrage, but only forbids
discrimination by a state or the United States; and that it does
not reach "denial" or "abridgement" through the acts of private
individuals. However, the conception of what constitutes an act
of the state seems to be much enlarged, in line with the position
taken by Justice Strong in construing the 14th Amendment.
From the standpoint of the four dissenting justices the 14th
Amendment got off to a bad start in The Slaughter House Cases.
Though racial discrimination was not directly involved it was the
dominating thought on both sides of the closely divided Court. But
if anything can be regarded as settled in the field of constitutional
law, this case gives a permanent interpretation of the fundamental
features of the 14th Amendment. In 1922 Charles Warren commented as follows upon the far-reaching results of this famous decision: "Had the case been decided otherwise, the states would have
largely lost their autonomy and become, as political entities, only of
historical interest. If every civil right possessed by a citizen of a
State was to receive the protection of the National judiciary, and
if every case involving such a right was to be subject to its review,
the States would be placed in a hopelessly subordinate position; and
the ultimate authority over the citizens of the State would rest with
the National Government. The boundary lines between the States
and the National Government would be practically abolished, and
the rights of the citizens of each State would be irrevocably fixed as
of the date of the Fourteenth Amendment, without power in the
State to modify them, and with power in the Supreme Court of the
Nation to review any State statute asserted to be in violation of
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such rights, even if such statute affected solely a matter of State
policy.

289

As to racial discriminations sought to be covered by the 14th
Amendment progress may be observed. Results held not obtainable
by direct congressional legislation have been reached through judicial interpretation of "due process," "privileges and immunities"
and "equal protection." In respect to segregation, while the Court
has seemed to accept as authoritative precedents the patterns set
by earlier cases, there has been a general tendency toward a broader
view. It has been held that in intrastate transportation separate accommodations must really be "equal"; and there is reason to hope
that when the question of separation in interstate commerce comes
squarely before the Court, Twentieth Century ideas of civil rights
may finally prevail. 240 Where the test of reasonableness is to be applied and the Court may exercise its discretion, is not the universal
sense of justice, adopted by Justice Matthews for the unanimous
Court in Yick Woo vs. Hopkins,2 41 more consistent with present-day
standards than the convenience of the carrier, found sufficient in
DeCuir vs. Louisiana, or the local "usages, traditions and customs"
of Plessy vs. Ferguson?
At the present writing residential segregation by statute or ordinance stands forbidden, but restrictive agreements among owners
have the sanction of Corriganvs. Buckley. The validity of race restrictions in conveyances remains an open question. In the industrial
relations of the Negro federal labor legislation has been effectively
summoned to'his aid.
There remains the important field of public school education.
However wise the statutory color-line may be as a matter of local
policy, the question of its constitutionality has never been squarely
met by our court of last resort.
239The Supreme Court in United States History, Vol. III, p. 269.
240As to whether they did prevail in Morgan vs. Virginia, decided June 3,

1946, while this article was in the hands of the printer, opinions will differ. The

case arose under a Virginia statute "which requires all passenger motor
vehicle carriers, both interstate and intrastate, to separate without discrimination the white and colored passengers in their motor buses so that contiguous
seats will not be occupied by persons of different races at the same time."
The Court, by Justice Reed, said: "This Court frequently must determine the

validity of state statutes that are attacked as unconstitutional interferences
with the national power over interstate commerce. This appeal presents that

question as to a statute that compels racial segregation of interstate passengers
in vehicles moving interstate." It was held that on account of public inconveniences incident to its execution the statute "so burdens interstate commerce
or so infringes the requirements of national uniformity as to be invalid."
Justice Jackson took no part. Justices Rutledge, Frankfurter and Black concurred in the result,-Justice Black with a sharp protest against "the undue
burden on commerce formula." Justice Burton presented a dissenting opinion.
241(1886) 118 U. S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220.

